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3Introduction: Objectives of this Benchmarking Study
This mini-mill steel case study for Tokyo Steel (TSC) was completed under a
three-year research grant from the Sloan Foundation. The project’s purpose was to
examine, in a series of case studies, how US and Japanese firms who are recognized
leaders in using information technology1 t  achieve long-term sustainable advantage have
organized and managed this process. While each case is complete in itself, each is part of
this larger study.2 A comparable US steel company case on mini-mills is underway for
Nucor.
This case for a Japanese mini-mill steel producer, together with other cases3, supports
an initial research hypothesis that leading software users in the US and Japan are very
sophisticated in the ways they have integrated software into their management strategies. They
use it to institutionalize organizational strengths and capture tacit knowledge on an iterative
                                         
1
 In this paper and the overall study, the terms “software, information technology (IT) and systems” are used interchangeably.
Further, when referring to the firm as a whole, the text uses “it”, but when referring to management, “they” is used.  The mini-
mill sector covers non-specialty steel producers using electric arc furnaces.
2 The industries and firms examined are food retailing (Ito-Yokado), semiconductors (NEC and AMD), pharmaceuticals (Takeda and
Merck), retail banking (Sanwa and Citibank), investment banking (Nomura and Credit Suisse First Boston), life insurance (Meiji and
Nationwide), autos (Toyota), steel (integrated mills and mini-mills, Nippon Steel, Tokyo Steel and Nucor), and apparel retailing (Isetan
and Federated).  Nationwide has replaced USAA, as the latter was unable to participate. These industries and cases were generally
selected based on the advice and research of specific industry centers funded by the Sloan Foundation.These re the computer and
software center at Stanford, the semiconductor and software centers at Berkeley, the financial services center at Wharton (University of
Pennsylvania), the pharmaceutical and auto centers at MIT, the steel project at Carnegie-Mellon, the food services project at the
University of Minnesota, and the apparel retailing center at Harvard. The case writer and the research team for this case thus wish to
express their appreciation to the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation for making this work possible and to the Sloan industry centers for their
invaluable assistance. They especially appreciate the time and guidance given by the steel research center at Carnegie-Mellon as well as
the staff at Tokyo Steel (TSC) who were generous with their time. Still, the views expressed in this case are those of the author and not
necessarily those of TSC or its management.
3
 This refers to cases for which interviews have been completed. See footnote 2.
4basis. In Japan this strategy has involved heavy reliance on customized and semi-customized
software (Rapp 1995), but is changing towards a more selective use of package software
managed via customized systems. This is seen in this case in Tokyo Steel’s development of a
system to automate and integrate its different mills. In turn, US firms, such as Merck, who
have often relied more on packaged software, are customizing more. This is especially so for
the systems needed to integrate software packages into something more closely linked with the
firm’s business strategies, markets, and organizational structure.
Thus, coming from different directions, there appears some convergence in approach by
these leading software users. The cases thus confirm what some other analysts have
hypothesized; a coherent business strategy is a necessary condition for a successful information
technology (IT) strategy (Wold and Shriver 1993).4 These strategic links for Tokyo Steel and
the Japanese steel industry are presented in the following case.5
                                         
4
 These and other summary results are presented in another Center on Japanese Economy and Business working paper:
William V. Rapp, “Gaining and Sustaining Long-term Advantage Through Information Technology: The Emergence of
Controlled Production,” December 1998. Also see: William V. Rapp, “Gaining and Sustaining Long-term Advantage Using
Information Technology: Emergence of Controlled Production,” Best Papers Proceedings, Association of Japanese Business
Studies, Salt Lake City, UT, June 1999.
5 All the cases are being written with a strategic focus.  That is, each examines a firm’s IT strategy rather than the specific
software or IT systems used. In this sense, they illustrate how IT is used to improve competitiveness rather than what specific
software a firm is using. The latter is generally only noted to illustrate and explain the former. This emphasis was not specified
when the project began but has evolved as research has progressed. There are three major reasons the cases have become
focused this way. First, at a detailed level, all these firms have unique software and IT systems due to the way each weaves
organization with packaged and custom software. There is thus little others could learn if a case just explained each firm’s
detailed IT system or systems. Further, the cases would be long and would quickly drown the reader in data since IT pervades
all aspects of these very large corporations. This was apparent at an early stage in the study when the project team tried to
develop IT organization charts for Takeda, Merck, and NEC. The second reason is that, at a general level, differences in firm
IT systems can be almost trivial since there are only a limited number of operating system options, e.g. IBM mainframes, Unix
workstations, and Windows or MAC based PCs.  Third, information technology changes very rapidly and thus each firm is
constantly upgrading and evolving its systems. So detailed descriptions of each IT system would rapidly become obsolete. For
these reasons, focusing the cases on strategic principles developed as the best way to explain to readers something they could
use and apply in their own situations. This reasoning has been confirmed when the material has been presented in different
forums as discussants have commented favorably on the approach. Equally important, in the interviews and conversations with
management, this is where they have focused their responses. That is, as the various cases illustrate, the firms manage their IT
decision-making by following a set of strategic principles integrated with their view of their competitive environments. This is
similar to Nelson and Winter's (1982) rules and routines for other kinds of management decisions and innovations, and
illustrates these firms’ evolutionary approach to IT use and development. Their basic reasons for this incorporate the points
noted above, i.e. each firm’s unique system, the limited operating system options, and IT’s rapid technical change. Based on
what the case study teams have learned, therefore, it is these firms’ strategic approaches, including the concept of controlled
production explained later, that seem to have the widest applicability and offer other organizations the most potential insights
5This is because this case along with the other cases also illustrates that the
implementation and design of each company’s software and software strategy is unique to its
competitive situation, industry, and strategic objectives. These factors influence how each
chooses between packaged and customized software options for achieving specific goals, and
how each measures its success. Indeed, as part of each firm’s strategic integration, Tokyo Steel
and the other leading software users interviewed have linked software strategies with overall
management goals. This is achieved through clear mission statements that explicitly note the
importance of information technology to firm success.
Each has coupled this view with active CIO (Chief Information Officer) and IT
(information technology) support group participation in the firm’s business and decision
making structure. Thus, for firms such as TSC, the totally independent MIS (Management
Information Systems) department is a thing of the past. This may be one reason why
outsourcing IT development for TSC has not been a real option. However, the company’s
relatively successful business performance in steel is not based solely on software. Rather, as
                                                                                                                            
without becoming dated in how to use IT to improve competitiveness. The detailed strategy described here, though, only
applies to mini-mills producing steel in Japan.
6described below, software is an integral element of the firm’s overall management strategy
with respect to producing and selling steel through the Japanese trading companies (TCs) to
major customers, especially the Japanese construction firms. It also plays a key role in serving
corporate goals, such as enhancing mill productivity by improving order management,
production scheduling, and equipment processing, while reducing inventories or strengthening
supply capabilities. These systems are thus coupled with an appropriate approach to selling,
production, customer delivery, new product development, and constant cost reduction that
reflects TSC’s clear understanding of its business, its industry, and the firm’s competitive
strengths within this context.
This clear business vision (Appendix I), especially the strategic focus on continuing
cost reduction as described below, has enabled TSC’s management to select, develop, and use
the software they believe is required to assist TSC’s mills to operate at a higher and more
consistent level of performance. It also enables them to produce higher value added products,
such as hot rolled coil. In turn, TSC has integrated this support to its mills into a total
information system for the firm (Exhibit 1) that is linked with the company’s overall
operations. Since this vision has also impacted other corporate decisions, TSC seems to have
good human resource and financial characteristics, too. (See Appendices I & II on Strategy &
Operations as well as Firm & Industry Data).
Tokyo Steel does, however, share some common IT issues with other leading software
users. An example of this is the creation of large, proprietary, interactive databases that
promote automatic feedback between various stages of the order, production, and delivery
processes so that they and customers can track an order’s progress through the system. Its
ability to use IT to economize on traditional production systems and to batch inventories, by
7reducing the amount of steel that must be held at various points in the production process,
through integrating and making the process more continuous, is also a common management
initiative for other leading software users. In addition, TSC has been able, organizationally and
competitively, to build beneficial feedback cycles or loops that increase productivity in areas
such as customer delivery and product availability, while reducing cycle times and improving
production and product supply.
Management recognizes that better cycle times between TC orders and ultimate
delivery reduce costs and improve business forecasts since production plans are for shorter
periods. Customer satisfaction is enhanced, as well, through more timely completion of the
process. Therefore, software inputs are critical factors in TSC’s and other leading users’ overall
business strategies. There are strong positive results for doing it well, and potentially negative
implications for competitors.
However, TSC does not appear to be a leader in a possible new production paradigm,
“controlled production” (“CP”). Rather, it appears to be a very efficient mass production
producer, using economies of scale for standardized products, as well as incorporating aspects
of lean production by integrating discrete production processes, and tying output more closely
to actual demand. It has not, however, developed an approach for capturing the significant
improvements in productivity delivered by “controlled” production. This is because “CP”
requires monitoring, controlling, and linking every aspect of producing and delivering one’s
products and services, including after-sales support and product changes. TSC has not yet
developed this approach, and it does not appear to be part of its longer-term strategy, since it
continues to rely on the TCs for order flow and independent scrap producers for its major raw
material. A controlled production approach would require actively using IT systems to
8continuously monitor and control functions that were part of a supply structure responding to
changes in expected or actual consumer demand. That approach would also use IT to influence
or stimulate those changes in demand. It would also work to influence the characteristics of its
supply chain. Such external effects can only happen when IT is integrated with the firm’s total
business environment, both internal and external, from an operational and organizational
standpoint, reflecting an overall business strategy and clarity of competitive vision that seeks to
actually impact the external environment to the firm’s competitive advantage.
Nevertheless, IT systems are integral to how TSC organizes, delivers and supports its
mills and steel business, from product development, to ordering, to production, and through to
delivery. This sequence is particularly critical in steel where the demand and supply for
particular products shifts according to the customers’ business and economic situation. That is,
as economic conditions affect the demand for autos, ships, and construction differently, the
mix of steel products demanded by TSC’s clients, through the TCs, is constantly shifting.
In TSC’s case, as with the other leading software users examined in this case study
series, the key to using software successfully is to develop a mix of packaged and customized
software that supports the firm’s business strategies and differentiates it from competitors.
TSC’s management has done this by using IT to enhance TSC’s existing organizational
strengths as a low cost producer of standard steel products, rejecting the idea of trying to adapt
its organizational structure to the software used.
They have also looked to functional gains to justify the additional expense incurred in
customizing certain systems. These expenses include the related costs of integrating
customized and packaged SW into a single information system while training employees to use
it. This integration is done by first assessing the possible business uses of software within the
9organization and its operations. Particular focus is placed on IT’s role in enhancing TSC’s core
competencies in more efficiently developing, producing, and delivering several different types
of standard steel products. Management, therefore, does not accept the view that IT systems are
generic and are best developed by outside vendors who achieve low cost through economies of
scale and who can more easily afford to invest in the latest technologies.6
Approach: Methodology and Questions
In undertaking this and the other case studies to assess the importance for each firm of
the issues noted above, the project team sought to answer key questions while recognizing
firm, country, and industry differences.  These have been explained in the summary paper
referenced in footnote 4. They are set forth in Appendix I as well, where TSC’s profile is
presented based on the company interviews and other research. Readers who wish to assess
how TSC’s strategies and approaches to using IT address these issues may wish to review the
                                         
6 Tokyo Steel and the other cases have been developed using a common methodology that examines cross-national pairs of
firms in key industries. In principle, each pair of cases focuses on a Japanese and American firm in an industry where software
is a significant and successful input into competitive performance.  Excepting Nationwide Insurance, the firms examined are
ones recommended by the Sloan industry centers as ones using SW successfully. A leading securities analyst recommended
Nationwide as a replacement for USAA. So all the firms are recognized by their industries as being good at using IT to
improve competitiveness. To develop these “best-practice” studies, the research team combined analysis of current research
results with questionnaires and interviews. Further, to relate these materials to previous work as well as the expertise located in
each industry center, the team talked with the industry centers. In addition, it coupled new questionnaires with the materials
used in a previous study to either update or obtain a questionnaire similar to the one used in the 1993-95 research (Rapp 1995).
This method enabled the researchers to relate each candidate and industry to earlier results. The team also worked with the
different industry centers to develop a set of questions that specifically relate to a firm’s business strategy and software’s role
within that. Some questions address issues that appear relatively general across industries, such as inventory control. Others
such as managing the IC manufacturing process are more specific to a particular industry. The focus has been to establish the
firm’s perception of its industry and its competitive position as well as its advantage in developing and using a software
strategy. The team also contacted customers, competitors, and industry analysts to determine whether competitive benefits or
impacts perceived by the firm were recognized outside the organization. These sources provided additional data on measures
of competitiveness as well as industry strategies and structure. The case studies are thus based on extensive interviews by the
project team on IT’s use and integration into management strategies to improve competitiveness in specific industries,
augmenting existing data on industry dynamics, firm organizational structure, and management strategy collected from the
industry enters. Further, data was gathered from outside sources and firms or organizations that had helped in the earlier
project. Finally, the US and Japanese companies in each industry were selected based on being perceived as successfully using
software in a key role in their competitive strategies. In turn, each firm saw its use of software in this manner while the
competitive benefits were generally confirmed after further research. In the case of steel, the team was particularly aided by
presentations given by the Carnegie-Mellon steel group at the annual Sloan Industry Center Meetings from 1997-99 as well as
the book produced by that Center (Ahlbrandt, Fruehan, and Giarratani 1996).
10
summary prior to reading the case. For others, the profile summary may represent a useful
outline.7
Introduction to Case
The case study begins by placing Japan’s steel industry, particularly its mini-mills, in a
competitive context and then examines the governmental policies, economic factors, and
competitive dynamics affecting Japan’s steel markets and its mini-mill producers. As Japan's
leading independent mini-mill producer (Appendix II), Tokyo Steel's evolution, competitive
situation, and current strategies are an integral part of this picture. Its present situation well
illustrates the competitive issues facing Japan’s mini-mill steel producers. Currently, the large,
integrated Japanese steel companies, as well as foreign producers, are aggressively challenging
the Japanese mini- mills in their domestic market, having largely driven them from export
markets in the 1980s and 90s. It is thus critical for TSC to successfully manage its development
in this increasingly competitive Japanese market, especially for the standard products it
produces. Indeed, it has little choice since steel products represent virtually all its revenues,
operating earnings, and invested capital (Appendix II). In 1997, 99% of its sales were steel
products, and most of its profits (88%) came from domestic sales (Yamada & Cosgrove 1998).
At the same time, TSC’s organizational structure and software product choices help us
understand its use and demand for IT. The case study then describes how TSC uses IT as a tool
to create competitive advantage in selling and delivering steel products. The last section
summarizes the research and case study findings and identifies other potential strategic benefits
                                         
7
 The questions are broken into the following categories: General Management and Corporate Strategy, Industry Related
Issues, Competition, Country Related Issues, IT Strategy, IT Operations, Human Resources and Organization, Various
Measures such as Inventory Control, Cycle Times, and Cost Reduction, and finally some Conclusions and Results. The
questions cover a range of issues from direct use of software to achieve competitive advantage, to corporate strategy, to criteria
for selecting software, to industry economics, to measures of success, to organizational integration, to beneficial loops, to
11
from TSC’s use of IT. However, to appreciate IT’s role within TSC’s total strategy and
business operation, some industry, market, and economic characteristics need to be explained.8
The Industry Context: Japan’s Steel Industry and its Mini-Mills9
In their 1996 assessment of Japan’s steel industry and of Tokyo Steel, Ahlbrandt,
Fruehan, and Giarratani (A, F&G 1996) describe a market that in the early 1990s “was
awakened to the fact business as usual would no longer work.”  For the integrated producers,
this was a far cry from the 1960s and 1970s. Then Japan’s steel industry was perceived
globally as an industrial juggernaut, dominating world steel markets and giving Japanese steel
users such as auto producers and shipbuilders a huge competitive advantage (O’Brien 1992;
Ostrom 1996; A, F&G 1996). In addition, this industrial clout was highly concentrated in five
large integrated firms (O’Brien 1992; Appendix II). However, beginning even in 1970, the
situation for Japanese mini-mill producers was quite different (Uriu 1991; A, F&G 1996). A
combination of the Nixon shock, that dramatically revalued the yen, and the first oil crisis, that
raised electricity prices, hit this industry particularly hard. Japanese growth and construction
demand fell, while costs rose sharply, forcing the industry into dire economic straights (Uriu
1991).
                                                                                                                            
training and institutional dynamics, and finally to inter-industry comparisons. These are summarized for Tokyo Steel in
Appendix I.
8 O’Brien (1992) describes how “steel was one of Japan’s earliest and possibly most dramatic industrial successes. … The
industry was rebuilt in the early 1950s, and, … for the next two decades, Japan’s steel output grew at an average annual rate of
15%. By 1976, the industry was capable of producing nearly 150 million tons of steel yearly and was responsible for 16% of
the world’s steel market share. Even in the mid-1980s, when it had lost superiority in steel to Korean companies, Japan
produced over 20 percent of the world’s steel exports.” But this assessment only applies to the integrated producers. Mini-mills
primarily converting scrap iron into rebar for construction have faced a very different situation (Uriu 1991).
9 Minimills use electric furnace technology that is far simpler and less capital intensive than integrated production. They use
steel scrap and, more recently, directly reduced iron ore in various forms that are melted by electric arcs generated between
graphite electrodes. Low start-up costs and simpler technology allow for easier entry and smaller localized production
(Appendix II). Thus, the mini-mill producers have the advantage of lower transportation costs, lower capital costs (about 25%
of an integrated mill), and a simpler production process that uses about half as many man-hours per ton produced (Appendix
II). However, as long as they depend on scrap inputs, they are limited in the quality of steel that they can produce. So in the
1970s and early 80s, Japanese mini-mill producers were largely confined to the construction market, producing re-enforcing
bar (rebar) for concrete construction. In 1980 more than 87% of total mini-mill output was bar steel and structural shapes, both
12
These economic pressures built during the 1970s from two sources (Uriu 1991). The
first was the further decline in domestic steel demand for construction, as the Japanese
economy felt the combined pressures of further yen appreciation and another oil crisis. The
second was the emergence of a small group of more efficient mini-mill competitors such as
Tokyo Steel. It was during this period that a “boom & bust” cycle emerged that caused the
industry to periodically seek protection under various guises as a “depressed” industry. These
periods often coincided with government fiscal policies that sought to either stimulate or
restrain the economy (Uriu 1991). While exports provided some relief in the 1970s and early
1980s, unlike the integrated producers, exports by Japanese mini-mills virtually disappeared
with the yen’s rapid appreciation after the Plaza Accord, in 1985. So today Japan’s mini-mill
industry is basically local steel production for the local construction market.
Some firms tried to solve the problem of declining demand and rising costs by just
rationalizing production, reducing capacity and their labor force, while seeking government
(MITI) controls against downward price pressures. Others, however, evolved into new, higher
value-added products while modernizing and improving production efficiency. Even though
the latter were considered “outsiders”, their strategy was quite successful against the relatively
inefficient and economically weak mini-mill competitors, who became weaker with every
boom & bust cycle, despite their initial political influence (Uriu 1991).10 As Uriu ( 991)
                                                                                                                            
used in construction. In 1985 bar steel accounted for 62% of industry output. Thus, in the 1970s the combination of a weak
construction market and much higher energy costs due to the two oil crises was devastating (Uriu 1991 and A, F&G 1996).
10 Robert Uriu in his doctoral dissertation on Japan’s depressed industries notes: “On the one hand were the industry ‘insiders,’
the majority of firms in the industry that, because of their relative lack of competitiveness, favored collective stabilization
efforts. On the other hand was a small group of firms, known as the industry ‘outsiders,’ that preferred a market solution.
During the 1970s it was the industry ‘insiders’ that held sway. The insiders persistently sought to impose industry-wide
limitations on total production, and later on excess capacity, … The industry succeeded in mobilizing public policy in support
of its stabilization efforts: the industry appealed for and was granted permission to form a series of recession cartels to monitor
and enforce cooperative production cuts, and later sought designation under new legislation passed in 1978, the Structurally
Depressed Industries Law (Tokuanho), to help in the coordinated reduction of excess supply. However, the bitter conflict
between those in favor and those opposed to stabilization eroded the tenuous consensus among the minimills, … By the mid-
1980s the minimills had gradually abandoned their efforts to seek industry-wide reductions in output, which had proven
essentially unenforceable.”
13
explains concerning these “outsiders”, of whom the leader was TSC, “The competitiveness of
these firms, which accounted by 1980 for about 25% of the industry’s capacity, made them
confident that they could prosper without stabilization efforts. These firms were not only
unwilling to cut production, but were determined to increase their production shares at the
expense of firms that were cooperating to stabilize competition.”  In fact, these “outsider”
firms, who felt they could succeed without price “stabilization”, were ultimately proven right
since their lower costs meant they were able to better survive the downturns, while making
more money during the upswings than their inefficient competitors. These funds allowed them
to expand capacity. Indeed, during the 1980s, TSC built large cash reserves and funded its
expansion mostly from cash flow or stock issues, while remaining relatively debt-free
(Appendix II).
Tokyo Steel has been the leader of this “outsider” group, roughly, since 1972, and its
clear economic success by the late 1980s is a testimony to its successful strategic initiatives
(Appendix II). This is because, realistically, their approach could not be replicated by most
mini-mill competitors.11 For example, while the total production of Japan’s mini-mill
producers
fell from 11.3 million tons in 1973 to 7.0 to 8.0 million for 1975-78, TSC was able to increase
its share from 4.3% to 9.4% (Uriu 1991).12 Indeed, TSC continued to increase its capacity from
                                         
11 This is not true though relative to integrated firms in 1990s. (See Appendix II “Cost Reduction Efficiency Indices Major Japanese
Producers 1994-98” where 6% cost reductions are shown as being replicated by all integrated producers.) In fact, as A, F&G (1996) note,
integrated producers were quite effective in “reducing the size of their corporate bureaucracy, cutting out management layers, combining
jobs, and speeding up decision making by forcing it down farther in the organization.” Unfortunately, TSC, who was already quite lean,
could not achieve similar economies. Its combined executive and sales offices occupy one floor of a building and are less than 50 people
(A, F&G 1996). So the increased competitive price pressures due to industry-wide cost reductions has actually hurt them (Appendix II)
with their costs as a percent of revenue per ton rising from 86.0% in 1993 to 104.5% in 1997.
12 Today’s Tokyo Steel was formed from the 1975 merger of Tosa Denki and Tokyo Seitetsu. Uriu (1991) explains this
development during the depressed output period from 1974-78. “The story of the young president of Tosa Denki Seikojo (later
to merge with Tokyo Seitetsu), deserves mention. Iketani Masanari, the son of Iketani Taro, the then president of Tokyo
Seitetsu, had entered his father’s firm in 1968. When the ailing Tosa Denki, at that point Japan’s 7th l rgest bar steel producer,
asked Tokyo Seitetsu for help in managing its operations, the junior Iketani was sent as managing director in 1969 and became
Tosa Denki’s president in 1970, at the age of 25. By 1975 Iketani had transformed Tosa Denki into Japan’s largest bar steel
14
about 1.8 million tons in 1980 to 4 million tons in 1994 (Uriu 1991 and A, F&G 1996). This
helped TSC maintain competitiveness while also raising production at its mills. Financial
performance also improved (Appendix II). In this sense TSC was able to do in a depressed
                                                                                                                            
producer, and had no intention of curbing future growth plans for the sake of stabilizing the market or rescuing ailing
minimills. Tosa Denki and Tokyo Seitetsu merged in December 1975, soon after the 1975 cartel was formed, with the junior
Iketani becoming president (the senior Iketani became the firm’s chairman). He and Tokyo Seitetsu then embarked on a
decade-long confrontation with the insider minimills … Tokyo Seitetsu’s competitive edge can be seen first in its growing
market share: in 1965, the combined output of Tokyo Seitetsu and Tosa Denki was 4.3 percent of the industry’s total output,
while 10 years later this figure had more than doubled, to 9.4 percent. Similarly, their combined share of bar steel nearly tripled
in this period. Second, it had remained remarkably free of external borrowing. Whereas the rest of the minimills had borrowed
upwards of ¥500 billion, mostly from shosha and banks, Tokyo Seitetsu had been able to use internal resources to fund its
expansion efforts. … Tokyo Seitetsu’s underlying competitiveness and independent position made Iketani a fervent believer in
the free market, and absolutely opposed to the recession cartels and other cooperative efforts. He lambasted the rest of the
industry for attempting cooperative solutions, arguing that such arrangements would allow uncompetitive firms to survive
without trying to lower costs or improving technology, and would hurt the more competitive firms.” He thus moved ahead
aggressively between 1978 and 1980, completing 2 large furnaces and a large bar mill at Okayama and increasing bar
production by almost 95% as well as market share from 4 to 7% (Uriu 1991). This scenario was repeated during the 1980-81
recession when TSC expanded output by a third and increased its market share to 9 percent.
15
industry what many successful Japanese firms had done in a growth market (Abegglen & Stalk
1985): build capacity, gain market share, improve efficiency, lower costs, lower prices, gain
market share, build more new modern capacity, further lower costs, etc., etc.
Even in the 1970s, more energy-efficient production technologies had achieved a 20%
reduction in energy costs per ton of crude steel. At the same time, TSC like other Japanese
companies (“Kaisha”) (Abegglen & Stalk 1985) gradually moved into higher quality products,
forcing out existing competitors. (The firm data presented in Appendix II clearly show the shift
from low value commodity products, such as rebar, in to H-Beams, and more recently, to hot
rolled coil.) This approach worked quite successfully through the Bubble Period (1985-89). At
that point TSC’s strategy brought it on a collision course with the large integrated producers,
who for the first time, were facing significant economic and competitive difficulties of their
own (Ostrom 1996; A, F&G 1996; Appendix II). However, unlike the situation in the US, the
large integrated firms did not move over for the expanding mini-mill producers.  Instead they
fought back aggressively with pricing and product innovation strategies of their own (A, F&G
1996; Appendix II; footnote 11). A, F&G (1996) note that “in the H-beam market, for instance,
Tokyo Steel held a 30% market share in the early 1990s, but as steel demand declined, Nippon
Steel began to focus on this market through aggressive price competition. By 1994, sluggish
demand coupled with Nippon’s aggressiveness drove the price of H-beams down by more than
half. Nippon Steel and its affiliates succeeded in capturing about 30 percent of the market with
Tokyo Steel’s share falling below 20 percent.” This competitive situation continued through
1996 (Harada 1998 and Appendix II.)13
                                         
13 Interestingly, this was a different result from what happened in the early 1980s when TSC and other “outsiders” first entered
the H-Beam market and were attacked by the integrated mills.  During that period, the mini-mills’ share rose from 24.3% in
1977 to 59.1% in 1987. However, as noted elsewhere, the integrated producers in the interim had significantly cut costs due to
the fact that “the majors by the 1980s had been shocked out of their complacency, and made significant rationalization efforts,”
(Uriu 1991). At the same time, the minimills were facing the difficulties of a strong yen and a weak domestic market.
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Further, the appreciation of the yen in the 1990s, along with the collapse of the Bubble
Economy meant that all Japanese producers, both integrated and mini, were now subject to
greater economic impacts due to trade fluctuations and international competition. This meant
exchange rate changes and external steel demand would play a much larger role than before in
determining firm profitability and the demand for all Japanese steel in domestic and export
markets. While exports had been an important demand factor for Japanese integrated producers
since the 1960s (O’Brien 1992), as noted above, after the early 1980s exports were not
important for the mini-mills that were supplying a low value product, re-enforcing bar, to the
Japanese construction industry. Indeed, given the relatively large number of producers and no
outlet for the excess capacity that reached 5 million tons in 1987, the industry was subject to
“cutthroat competition … exacerbated by the undifferentiated nature of the main minimill
product, bar steel,” (Uriu 1991).14
This changed somewhat as TSC and some other companies moved into higher value
added products such as H-beams or plate for construction (Appendix II). Nevertheless, a strong
or weak Yen relative to the dollar or currencies tied to the dollar have had an effect. This is due
to the fact the Japanese mini-mills’ main raw material is local steel scrap that is priced in yen
and is often above US prices (A, F&G 1996) whereas the integrated producers import coal and
iron ore from overseas priced in dollars. Therefore, when the yen is strong, the integrated
producers have a cost advantage in the areas where they compete with minimills, and when it is
weak, minimills have an advantage. Also, TSC’s flat-rolled products compete with imports, so
that the weak yen in 1998 helped them, but its recent strengthening in 1999 has hurt them
(Yoshida 1996). The worst market combination for minimills and TSC, therefore, is a strong
                                         
14 In mid 1970s there were 250 producers of bar steel, including 50 mini-mills and 5 major integrated producers, the latter
having 12% of the market (Uriu 1991).
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yen and weak domestic demand, such as the current (1999) strong yen and depressed economy.
This was also true during the industry’s first big drop in demand, following the Nixon Shock in
1971 and the yen’s first major upward revaluation.15  F r her, in these circumstances, greater
competition in export markets for integrated producers stimulates their interest in selling into
the local construction market, even at marginal cost, in order to maintain mill output since
shutting down a blast furnace is very costly (O’Brien 1992).
This is why a weak yen or the converse situation is not necessarily bad for the
integrated producers.16 Indeed, Mr. Nagai, of Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, has argued how a
weak yen can potentially help the profitability of Japanese integrated steel producers (Nagai
1998). Given these various market conditions, though, it is very difficult for Japanese mini-mill
producers to anticipate either prices or demand. Also, international market pressures have been
exacerbated by Japan’s continued economic weakness that limits local demand generally. So
other large Japanese corporations are not building or expanding capacity, thereby reducing the
demand for construction steel, the minimills’ main market (Harada 1998). Therefore, TSC’s
assets and revenues have actually shrunk since 1993, though production capacity has expanded
somewhat to over four million tons (Appendix II).
Added to these considerations is the assessment of some observers that Japan still has
too much steel capacity in both mini-mill and integrated production (A, F&G 1996, Harada
1998a, and Tilton 1999). Indeed, due to the expansion of Tokyo Steel and others, Japanese
mini-mills in 1994 accounted for over 30% of Japan’s raw steel production, up from 24% in
1980, even though Japanese steel demand has not grown (Appendix II). Thus, firms such as
                                         
15 For contrary views on constant downward price pressures on steel producers, see Tilton (1999) & Ostrom (1996).
16 In 1998 Nikko’s Mr. Harada (1998a) expected 1998 steel demand to be 95 million tons, down from 102.8 million in 1997.
Also, he expected exports to the US to fall due to a stronger yen and US anti-dumping pressures.
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TSC must rationalize and modernize operations further to maintain their position as flexible,
low cost producers of standard steel products for the construction industry.
Given this combination of factors, it is hardly surprising that TSC and other efficient
Japanese mini-mill producers have concentrated their efforts on efficiency in all respects. They
have also started and expanded production of higher value added products: first, H-beams in
the late 1970s, then flat-rolled products such as hot-rolled coil in 1992, and cold-rolled
galvanizing in 1997 (Yoshida 1996;Appendix II). Unlike the integrated producers, they have
not diversified into new businesses, and they have kept their head office operations very lean.
Nor have they participated to any great extent in the global proliferation of new steel capacity.
Indeed, TSC recently announced the sale of its interest in Tamco, a US mini-mill producer
(Yamada & Cosgrove 1998).
However, as explained above, almost all the large Japanese integrated steel producers
are still very much in the steel business. Further, they have announced and successfully
executed several rationalizations (Appendix II and footnote 11) and remain formidable
competitors.17 It is for this reason that TSC has recognized that another strategic approach is
required to address the cyclical nature of the industry, the increase in global cost-based
                                         
17 In 1995 Mr. Fujitani (1995) of NKK noted that all “the five major Japanese steel companies have targeted cost reductions
totaling 930 billion yen in 3 years from 1994. (NKK’s target is 175 billion yen). Cost reduction measures include first,
reduction of employees eliminating multi-layer management (about 25,000 employees) through a 25% cutback of white collar
and20% cutback of blue collar employees relying on substantial incentives for early retirement and relocation to subsidiaries;
second, cutback of capital investment to 30-40% of traditional investment; third, drastic reconsolidation of manufacturing
plants; and fourth, reconstruction or readjustment of diversified businesses and more concentration on core businesses.”
Similarly NSC reported in its 1997 Annual Report (NSC 1997) that during its 3d Medium Term Business Plan for FY1994-96
it reduced annual steel division costs by ¥300 billion. In addition, during 1996 it implemented “a new strategy designed to
precisely respond to market trends under a single, unified system integrating by product, the whole of manufacturing,
marketing and research and development resources.” See Appendix II for cost and price impacts of these cost-down strategies.
These cost reduction strategies take account of the “multipart process” noted by Ostrom (1996). “In an integrated plant iron ore
goes in one end of the mill, and finished steel products come out the other. Hence, steel makers need a variety of raw and
intermediate materials, such as iron ore or steel scrap, as inputs. In Japan these account for three-quarters of the cost of
producing a ton of steel. At least for an integrated plant, steel companies also need massive amounts of capital. A plant with an
annual capacity of 3 million metric tons of crude steel requires around $5 billion in capital; this accounts for about half of the
remaining cost of production. By contrast, labor costs are relatively modest and comprise about one-third the costs net of raw
materials and intermediate inputs. The 10 percent share of total costs accounted for by labor in the steel industry contrasts with
the 25 percent share paid to labor in the case of labor-intensive industries, such as precision instruments.”
19
competition, and periodic excess capacity. Otherwise, the firm’s basic business as well as the
company would continue to be a toy of exchange rate fluctuations and global economic
fluctuations (Harada 1998a and A, F&G 1996).
Therefore, the strategic problem for a Japanese mini-mill producer such as Tokyo Steel
as for US mini-mill such as Nucor, is how to remain a low cost producer in order to ride the
waves of booms and busts, as well as to move into higher value added products. As Yoshida
(1996) explains increased productivity, cost reduction, and an expanded product line are the
key elements of TSC’s strategy. However, for the latter part of its strategy to work, it must also
protect itself from the impact of increasingly differentiated, even customized, products being
offered by the integrated producers in the higher value added segments.18 Only in this way can
it create a lasting competitive edge in an increasingly competitive environment, from both
domestic and overseas competitors. Its vulnerability, in this latter respect, is reflected in TSC’s
relatively low share of contract sales with Japanese automobile and appliance manufacturers,
compared to the integrated producers (Yoshida 1996), especially as NSC’s customized, model
design, e-commerce strategy is specifically focused on increasing such contract sales.19
                                         
18 For a full discussion of Nippon Steel’s new customized casting and e-commerce strategy see case study: William V. Rapp,
“Steel: NIPPON STEEL, K.K., Gaining and Sustaining Long-term Advantage Through Information Technology,” Center on
Japanese Economy and Business Working Paper, Columbia, New York, 2000 (expected).
19 Regarding TSC’s strategic vision, Yoshida (1996) states: “In contrast to its same-industry competitors, who are pursuing
earnings recovery through personnel and capital investment reductions, Tokyo Steel has adopted a growth strategy based on a
long-term vision. Management has therefore continued to make large capital investments for improving profitability and
increasing production. This is why improvements in company performance have been slow to emerge.” With particular respect
to TSC’s flat-rolled product initiative, Yoshida (1996) observes the following: ”Of greatest interest in the company’s expanded
product line is hot-rolled coils, whose production began in October 1991, a first for domestic furnace operators. To facilitate
this venture, Tokyo Steel established a direct-current electric furnace, continuous casting facilities and a hot strip mill at its
Okayama plant. The production of pickled coils also began in April 1995, and the sales of steel sheet totaled 1,270,000 tons in
fiscal 1995.  … Tokyo Steel has entered the downstream area of flat-rolled production to increase the value added of its
products and to boost sales through an expanded product line. … Tokyo Steel has invested ¥70.0 billion in the Okayama
plant’s hot-rolled coil facilities, … Hot-rolled coil operations require fewer than 200 employees…, whose number remained
unchanged when production was increased threefold.” Similarly, he explains: “Tokyo Steel began the production of sheet piles
on its Kyushu plant’s H-beam line in April 1994. … This was a field dominated by blast furnace firms until the company’s
entry. In contrast to sheet piles priced at ¥100,000 per ton by blast furnace operators, Tokyo Steel is selling its product at
¥55,000 per ton. … The company is also planning to manufacture sheet piles at its Utsunomiya plant.”
Conversely, when it cannot increase production easily due to intense competition, it emphasizes cost reduction. So in terms of
H-beams and rebar, Yoshida explains TSC’s strategy as follows: “Tokyo Steel is seeking to raise the operating rate by
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While remaining low cost is important in most industries, this strategic issue is
especially critical in standard steel products. This is due to even more competition for the
available markets from an expanded number of competitors, both integrated mills in Japan and
new mills in the NICs (Newly Industrialized Countries) such as one recently announced for
Malaysia. The competitive field is increasingly crowded with Japanese and foreign firms of
every description. Nevertheless, if a firm can successfully and efficiently sell existing and new
customers a wider range of standard products at low cost, then cash flow should improve, as
sales and earnings increase. Indeed, this is what TSC did successfully in the 1970s and 80s in
competing against the inefficient “insiders”. However, it has stumbled a bit with this strategy
in the 1990s as it has encountered an aggressive response from the large integrated producers,
led by Nippon Steel (A, F&G 1996 and Appendix II). It remains to be seen whether this
approach will work in the decade ahead.20
This is the key strategic issue TSC has been facing. Ahlbrandt et al (1996) explain this
situation for the Japanese market in their study. “ Traditionally the integrated companies have
regarded their captive mini-mills as autonomous subsidiaries, letting them produce the less
technically sophisticated and more commonly oriented products, such as bars and shapes for
the housing and construction industries. This hands-off approach also characterized the way
they viewed the competition from the independent mini-mills – they paid little attention. All
                                                                                                                            
establishing a factory with the world’s most advanced facilities as well as by sharing production lines. The company has
invested ¥40.0 billion in the construction of a new plant in Utsunomiya to replace the large, aging steel shape plant in
Okayama. The new plant permits the continuous feeding of scrap and incorporates waste heat recovery, improvements that will
reduce electric power costs by 30%. … The Takamatsu plant has specialized in the production of reinforcing bars. Tokyo Steel
has invested ¥8.0 billion in a near complete overhaul of facilities, a project that was completed in October 1996. …
Streamlining … has reduced by 100 an employee count of 280, and productivity gains of 30% are anticipated. As part of the
overhaul, the Takamatsu plant will begin manufacture of wiring rods, a first for Tokyo Steel.” The latter are also a higher value
added product that will again expand its product line and should enhance revenues as well.
20 The situation is further complicated by the fact many minimills have ties to Nippon Steel and other integrated producers
(Uriu 1991 and A, F&G 1996). As many as 12-14 are linked to NSC, 3-4 with NKK, and 3-4 to Sumitomo. So the majors are
indirectly supplying bar in addition to their own 12% share.
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this changed when Nippon realized that Tokyo Steel was ‘invading’ its markets, as Nippon
Steel executives put it.
Tokyo Steel has a capability of producing about 4 million tons a year and had sales of
about $1.5 billion in 1994 (compared to Nippon Steel’s 25 million tons and 20 billion in sales).
It began to move its product lines into higher value-added markets in 1984, when it opened an
H-beam and plate mill. In 1992 Tokyo Steel entered the hot-strip market, and in 1995 it started
up a new mill to produce H-beams and sheet piling. It is also considering investments in cold-
rolled and galvanizing facilities for 1996. Each of these steps is a direct attack on the integrated
producers’ “most lucrative markets.” NSC’s response to this, as noted above, has been rapid,
competing on the basis of price for all products that overlap.
The impact of this on Tokyo Steel is seen clearly in its financial performance since
1993. In 1994, “while production fell by only 6 percent, its sales volume (valued in yen)
catapulted downward by a dramatic 25 percent, producing the first loss in nine years.”  These
losses have continued into 1998, with a concurrent impact on share value from ¥1400 to
around ¥500. It has dissipated their cash hoard and cash margins per ton produced (Appendix
II).
Yet, Tokyo Steel is the most successful independent EAF (Electric Arc Furnace)
producer in Japan. However, “it does not enjoy some of the advantages of US EAF companies.
Scrap prices can run 25 percent higher in Japan than the United States, and Japanese blast
furnace producers are very cost efficient. In addition, Tokyo Steel’s wage rates and bonus
levels are similar to those of their competitors in the integrated sector, and most of the work
practices (job rotation, few job classifications, and few restrictive work practices) are
comparable between the two. As a result, based strictly on operating costs Japanese minimills
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like Tokyo Steel are at about a 10 percent cost disadvantage. On a total cost basis, however,
minimills compete very well, and low fixed costs make the difference. Some of this can be
explained by the low capital costs associated with scrap-based production, but much of the
Japanese minimill advantage can be traced back to lean corporate structure and low over head,”
(A, F&G 1996).21
Nevertheless, the H-beam price competition became so severe that in 1996 Japan’s
domestic price was the lowest in the world, 7000 yen per ton below the US and 13,000 yen
below South Korea (Yoshida 1996). Therefore, since FY 1993 (3/94), losses due to the H-beam
war continued, resulting in five years of consecutive losses for Tokyo Steel, through FY 97
(Yamada & Cosgrove 1998; Appendix II). TSC’s solution to this situation has been to further
modernize and improve production efficiency, in which effort IT plays a critical role. For in
this kind of competitive situation, where one is producing a standard product of good or
acceptable quality, price and cost become the key variables. This is especially true when your
market, the Japanese construction industry, is suffering severe economic hardships. Still,
drastic cost cutting has not yet offset the impact of dramatic price declines (Appendix II).
Therefore, TSC has scrapped its plans to build a new hot-coil facility, and President Iketani has
made less aggressive marketing statements, indicating his intention to avoid competing directly
with the blast furnace producers, such as NSC (Yamada & Cosgrove 1998).
In October 1997, he commented in the Nikkei newspaper: “The principle raw material
for electric furnace makers is scrap iron generated by blast furnace-steel makers. Electric-
furnace makers must work within the limits imposed by the availability of scrap. We each have
                                         
21 TSC and other EAF producers’ situation can change dramatically with the exchange rate. In the summer of 1998 when the
yen was weak H. Suzuki (1998) could write that Japanese scrap prices were 34% below Korean prices making TSC the world’s
low cost H-beam producer. However by 1999, with the yen strengthening from over 140 to the $ to about 105 everything was
changed. For example, TSC can no longer export competitively to the US as yen appreciation eliminated the 20% Korean
premium and the 40% US premium. This again illustrates the need for a different strategy.
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our place in the market. Electric-furnace steel makers cannot become blast furnace steel
makers,”  (Yamada and Cosgrove 1998). Further, TSC appears to be curbing its previous
expansion plans, selling its Mie factory site to Chubu Electric (Iwano & Kusu 1998).
Tokyo Steel’s Focused Steel Strategy
TSC is very much a part of this competitive and economic environment. While its
financial situation is still good, with little debt and positive cash flow, its overall situation has
deteriorated, from exceptionally strong in 1993 to much weaker in 1998. Revenues for Fiscal
1998 of about ¥160 billion and expected revenues for 1999 of ¥140 million have been stagnant
since 1994, and are down significantly from over ¥200 million in 1993. Further, operating
losses of ¥7.7 billion are not expected to turnaround until Fiscal 1999 (March 2000), at the
earliest. In addition, it has been forced to draw down its large cash reserves to cover its
operating losses and capital expenditures (Appendix II). Therefore, it has not been able to
translate its expanded market share or its operating efficiencies in terms of man-hours and
expenses per ton, relative to other Japanese producers, into a meaningful and long-term
strategic benefit (Appendix II).
TSC recognizes that it needs to further improve its cost position to defend against the
industry’s continued downward price pressures, stagnant demand trends, and emerging
competitive developments.22 Furthermore, given the evolving economic and competitive
                                         
22 Out of a 103 million tons of steel products produced in Japan in 1995 and 1996, about 93 million ended as finished steel, split between
ordinary (78 MM tons) and specialty (15 MM tons) products. (The total included finished exports of about 22-24 MM tons.) About 53
million tons were hot and cold rolled products, including plates and sheets (coated, finished, and uncoated). Both domestically and for
export, automobiles are the largest users of high quality sheet, followed by appliance makers. NSC’s domestic share of the 11 major
Japanese car manufacturers is 40% and of the 8 major appliance makers 44%. It also has about 38% of Japan’s capacity to produce these
products compared to TSC’s 4% (NSC 1997a and Harada 1998). NSC’s share is more than twice the next producer, NKK, and 50%
more than its share of total Japanese steel production. Out of NSC’s total steel sales in 1996 of ¥1.7 trillion, ¥1.1 trillion were flat-rolled
products (NSC 1997a). Therefore, NSC’s strategy has been to concentrate on appliances and autos, through its customized casting and e-
commerce approach, that enhances its position in a market where its existing competency is very strong. This is consistent with
Ahlbrandt et al’s view that producers in “today’s steel market” can only succeed by choosing “markets where they believed it was
possible to create and sustain a competitive advantage” and by using “technology to help secure and maintain market position.” At the
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context for all Japanese steel companies explained above, this strategy has to address certain
fundamental conditions. It has to use its existing steel making capacity; it has to accept its
heavy dependence on the construction industry even for flat-rolled products; and it has to
establish a competitive advantage in steel products for construction relative to other Japanese
producers, including the large integrated ones. So while it has entered new markets that can use
its expanded rolling capacity, such as automobile demand for hot rolled coil (Harada 1998),
70% of its output is still used in construction projects (Yoshida 1996). However, the strategy
TSC has developed appears to address these conditions and depends on three basic aspects of
its business. In addition, this approach is currently benefiting from an increased interest in steel
frame houses and the current low interest rates and tax deductions that have stimulated an
expansion in Japanese housing demand.
The first is TSC’s very modern and efficient steel-making capacity as well as its trained
labor force. The second is its lean corporate management and production strategy, and the third
is its sophisticated use of IT to economically rationalize and manage production and
inventories. Though it is difficult, TSC makes a particular effort to manage and analyze the
complex information related to all aspects of its business. It makes sure its products and
customer supply structure are competitive, in terms of technological developments in both IT
and steel making. It has coupled this approach with an effort to integrate data management at
the order and corporate level (order allocation) with an IT system that links the head office
(HO) strategy with each mill. In turn, the mill’s production management system is linked with
its equipment controls to enhance each mill’s productivity. The object is to improve customer
                                                                                                                            
same time, this strategy poses a risk to TSC’s low cost standard product approach, since NSC will not only defend this market
vigorously, but may lock TSC out through a design-in, customized, JIT, e-commerce system that creates demand for customized not
standard products.
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supply, TSC’s pricing policies, and its production flexibility. In this manner, TSC is using IT to
achieve a result that meets the strategic goals for its various steel businesses.
One effect on steel users and providers of the global proliferation of steel products has
been that the relatively simple structure of Japan’s steel industry, from the consumers’ and
producers’ viewpoint, is changing rapidly. Previously, if one wanted to buy steel from a
Japanese producer you placed the order for a standard steel product through a Japanese trading
company (TC). The TC placed the order with a steel producer, and the steel was shipped to
either a domestic or export location. As explained by Tokyo Steel, for many standard products,
such as construction rebar, this system continues today.
For each standard product option, there is in fact a clear set of suppliers (Harada 1998).
However, for many other products, such as the wire used in a bridge (Fortune 1998) or the
sheet used in many automobiles and appliances (NSC 1997a and NSC 1997), the quality or
product produced is custom-made to client specifications. While there has always been some
steel product customization for particular projects, this has generally been on a case-by-case
basis, due to higher cost compared to buying the off-the-shelf, predetermined industry
standard. This is the tailor-made suit versus ready-made suit paradigm that is firmly entrenched
in the mass-production revolution that transformed the world economy during the 20th Century.
However, a new strategy is challenging that perception (see footnote 21). In particular
Nippon Steel is working to bring the steel business within the lean-production paradigm and
extend it into an emerging “controlled” production paradigm. The difference between this
“custom-made” approach and that used by other steel producers is presented in a briefing by
ENICOM, Nippon Steel’s 100%-owned IT subsidiary, (Enicom1998a). This report specifies
that NSC’s “all customer support” leads to “more frequent status reports, on-time delivery and
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more categorized products” that improves customer satisfaction. This is a direct challenge to
Tokyo Steel’s “commercial usage” for “ready-made” sales. Indeed, it will put a premium on
TSC meeting its focused cost-down strategy for standard products.
This is because by dominating the premium, truly high-value, end of the steel market
(customized sheet products for auto and appliance makers), NSC can aggressively pursue a
marginal cost pricing strategy in rebar and H-beams. We have already seen this in terms of
TSC’s initial expansion into H-beams, which, at the time, were high value-added products
from TSC’s viewpoint, but were a standardized, non-premium product from NSC’s position.
As described above, this enabled NSC to attack TSC’s and other mini-mills’ bread and butter
as well as TSC’s “high value” products. At the same time, NSC’s truly high-end business is
protected by its customized e-commerce approach (Rapp 2000). This pricing approach
becomes very attractive when it helps NSC keep its blast furnaces operating continuously at
capacity (O’Brien 1992). Similarly, it permits NSC to subsidize some of its related mini-mills
with “cheap” but high quality scrap from its mill-runs. Therefore, TSC has to develop plans
that will offer its customers a reasonable variety of standardized products at a competitive
price, without attracting “excessive” competition from NSC.
This means its goal is to determine how it can most efficiently produce these products
while also rationalizing its existing mill capacity, since further expansion into sheet and hot
rolled coil is risky. Only in this way can it maintain profitability and avoid the “excessive”
competition (Rapp 1999) typical of this boom-and-bust industry. Key aspects of TSC’s
strategic solution have been: building its new mill at Utsunomiya, that produces higher value
added products, such as hot rolled coil; producing products more continuously; and reducing
rebar capacity, which is a true commodity product (Appendix II). It is also emphasizing sheet
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steel for construction and autos, since, in these products, it only competes with the integrated
producers and higher quality mini-mills rather than the full spectrum of steel competitors.
TSC’s aims in implementing the new system are to automate and rationalize its mill
production so it can produce and deliver standard steel products in a timely, cost-effective
manner. TSC also needs to assure that these steel products develop along with its own steel-
making technology, in a way that is responsive to advances in the industry. This includes using
IT, as well as responding to its customer’s evolving needs. This will be a particular challenge
to the extent that NSC develops customized steels for some of those customers. Further, TSC
must continue to reduce delivery times, so it can better meet customers’ supply requirements
and pare its own inventories. This means tracking product requirements by customer group,
since TSC is very conscious of the expense of producing and delivering standard products to
different customers.
At the same time, TSC recognizes that working through the TCs means that its
customers are also targeted by competitors and competition is largely based on price. So
competition for their customers’ business will continue to be fierce. Indeed, this is a primary
driver for TSC’s focused cost-down product approach. As already explained, TSC has spent
considerable effort in evaluating costs and in increasing productivity. Indeed, it believes its
focused strategy is good at achieving cost-containment with revenue enhancement dependent
on moving to higher value added products. Both these approaches require constantly improving
steel making technology and IT system support. Further, TSC’s management recognizes that
this approach has become even more important, as old and new competitors add new, and
upgrade old, steel-making capacity. This is because increased competition puts pressure on
prices, especially when economic activity is depressed. It has, therefore, become critical to
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target market segments with specific standard product needs, and where TSC is the low cost
provider.
 Additionally, as the new IT system is constantly being revised based on the observed
“best practice” of its mills, the system is constantly improving the consistency, performance,
and productivity of both the mills and TSC’s production efficiency overall. So far the system
has improved not only product delivery, but has lowered costs. As explained below, the system
achieves these results by simplifying deskwork and order tracking; by confirming and
allocating the order; and by adding value through supporting each mill’s optimal functioning.
Yet, this is an iterative process, involving trial and error. For instance, operational and system
control problems at the new Utsunomiya Works required various system and plant layout
modifications that took about a year to resolve. And in 1998 quality problems at Takamatsu
required a change in the production process (Iwano 1998).
Furthermore, because new systems are development cost-intensive, the costs are subject
to user-base economics (Rapp May 1997 and Gurley 1998). That is, each additional user or
sale reduces the cost of delivering products to others by spreading the fixed system’s costs over
more and more users or output. Success in this area is thus subject to a beneficial loop of
increasing returns. A clear indication of the benefits to the TSC of this strategy has been its
ability to expand the production of some of its mills and further reduce staff without any loss in
efficiency. This should give it some of the cost and operating profit advantages it needs at a
time when corporate earnings and revenues are under pressure (Appendix II). Importantly, the
steel analyst at Nikko was aware of what TSC was doing in terms of IT and its mill production
system, and felt these definitely improved TSC’s competitive situation.
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TSC’s management’s approach is, of course, dynamic in that they are constantly
looking for ways to improve cost and operating efficiencies, as well as the required IT support.
This is part of the constant strategic upgrading and development of the company’s IT and steel
production system that has allowed it to increasingly shift towards higher grade steel products
at lower costs. The basic decision criterion in this respect has been to enhance the mills’
capabilities with systems and machines, to expand the capacity of the system, and to reduce
costs, all through extending the use of electronics and mill capacity (A, F&G 1996 and
Yoshida 1996). However, TSC needs to keep in mind its ultimate customers’ shifting needs so
that it is always targeting those who want higher quality standard products at lower cost.
Information Technology Infrastructure and Project Selection
TSC’s basic information system is a typical Japanese “three-tier” mainframe system,
similar to most other large Japanese companies (Rapp 1995).23 The mainframe manages a
series of servers that manage the PCs and workstations (Exhibit 1).24 In addition, because it is a
real time on-line system, it has been totally integrated with TSC’s own business operations, as
is typical of most large Japanese firms.
In addition to reducing paperwork, the improved systems and communications have
facilitated order tracking and processing, improving customer satisfaction. The clear objectives
of speeding communication, improving mill productivity, and increasing client satisfaction
have thus enabled TSC to select, develop, and use the software required for each function, and
                                         
23 The mainframe (Fujitsu) at the Okayama plant controls servers that control the network system and communicate with the
mills and their equipment. The mainframe has the task of scheduling production and operations, as well as tracking orders
(Exhibit 1). The next IT project is how to use the accumulated information to improve the system and its competitive impact.
24 TSC uses a client server system (9 FNA servers) controlled by a mainframe at the Okayama plant (Fujitsu GS 8400) -
Exhibit 1. So this is a large system. Each plant and office has its own IT system since each location has its own unique
operation in terms of what it is doing. In fact each plant decides its own actual production once it has been assigned orders by
head office. So how much each plant produces is related to these assigned sales.
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to integrate it into the support system. This is because it is relatively easy to measure whether
these objectives have been achieved. Except for the operating systems, TSC has generally
developed all its own software and IT systems.
Outline of Systems Use at TSC 25
Tokyo Steel’s main computer operation, in fact, is not at the Head Office (Honsha) but
is at its main mill in Okayama (Exhibit 1). The host computer located there is a Fujitsu
mainframe. It, in turn, is connected directly to TSC’s mills or Kojo at Kyuushuu, Utsunomiya,
and Takamatsu, in addition to the mill at Okayama. They have major offices in Tokyo (Head
Office), Osaka, and Hiroshima. Their branches in Kyuushuu and Nagoya are connected to the
system via the Hiroshima and Osaka branches, respectively. A high speed WAN (Wide Area
Network) is used to connect the mills and the offices. There are local area networks within
each mill and office. Each branch office and mill has a local server, and there is a process
computer for each mill.
Orders are received at the branch offices by fax from the trading companies (TC). That
has been the typical system for all steel companies until the recent advent of NSC’s e-
commerce system for appliance and auto producers. So TSC is part of the TC steel ordering
network, just like the integrated blast furnace producers. But it has not yet migrated to the e-
commerce system, developed by the integrated producers with the TCs, to serve the appliance
and automobile industries. However, to the extent that the new e-commerce system becomes a
vortex business, TSC will be forced to follow as the TCs push in this direction, with perhaps
                                         
25 Based on briefing by Tokyo Steel’s Head Office (HO) Systems Group July 1998. Meeting was with the young Mr. Iketani,
who is in charge of finance and administration that includes TSC’s IT department. Mr. Noguchi, the manager in charge of IT,
was there too, in order to explain the details of TSC’s IT operation and its relation to steel making.
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adverse competitive consequences for TSC (Gurley 1998).26 However, TSC does have plans to
use the Internet for receiving orders, which is consistent with the extension of the e-commerce
strategy as presented by NSC (Dazai 1997 and Dazai & Maruyama 1997).27
When the branch receives the fax, it inputs the information into TSC’s system. But from
TSC’s perspective, it is not yet an order. This only happens after all the data on all orders from
all the branches for that day are received. It is at this time that TSC prepares a production
schedule and a specific order is then sent to a given mill. The order flow is connected to the
process computer that controls each mill, and the data flows back to the Host Computer at
Okayama. Once the orders have been assigned to a particular mill, TSC will then aggregate the
material requirements associated with these orders, based on the product mix actually ordered.28
                                         
26 J. William Gurley (1998) has an excellent analysis of the criteria needed to establish a strategically effective e-commerce
system. He notes such a system must address both industry and IT issues. More specifically he stresses that “the companies
that will do well … are the ones that take the time to understand the context of the industry in which they operate. Rather than
aggregate technology, they must aggregate context.” For this reason, “the home-run opportunities belong to companies with
people who deeply understand how a particular industry works; who understand how the Internet as a channel can serve that
industry. These companies will build Websites that aggregate buyers and sellers to help facilitate both the decision-making
process and the subsequent delivery of products or services. Kevin Jones of Int ractive Week calls these butterfly businesses,
because if you draw a picture of a service that aggregates buyers and sellers, it involves two triangles pointing inward at the
single Web source.” Gurley “prefers to call these sites vortex businesses, since their success involves aggregating not just the
two butterfly wings of buyers and sellers, but also technology, content, and commerce.” Further, he emphasizes “the hard part
isn’t assembling technology; the hard part is aggregating context;” only in this way can one “create an industry transforming
vortex.”
A key element in this regard is “understanding the features and specifications a customer would typically evaluate to make a
purchase decision. The intricacies of such decisions vary enormously from industry to industry; … search routines need to be
set up to follow the thinking of a typical industry decision-maker.” In addition, the system must reflect “a complete
understanding of the way products or services are moved in each industry. How are products ordered? How are they
delivered?” Finally, the vortex must make “the information generated at the Website … available in various forms to the
industry community.” From these perspectives, the e-commerce system NSC has helped pioneer for Japanese steel would seem
to meet Gurley’s criteria as a vortex business. Furthermore, NSC would seem to be in his words a “New Age facilitator”. This
is because it is helping to integrate a large fragmented commercial market with “many independent buyers and sellers … who
will find value in a single, automated site that concentrates information” and where “acquiring the data needed to build the
content on the site” is “not overly difficult.”
27 For detailed discussion of NSC’s e-commerce strategy and the challenges its poses for all steel  makers and buyers see
William V. Rapp, “Steel: Nippon Steel, K.K., Gaining and Sustaining Long-term Advantage Through Information
Technology,” Center on Japanese Economy and Business Working Paper, Columbia, NY, 2000 (expected)
28 While, from this description there seems to be a direct connection between TSC’s raw material, i.e. scrap purchases and its
order flow, actually the connection is quite tenuous. Rather, TSC decides to buy or not to buy scrap according to price
fluctuations. Therefore, if TSC feels the scrap price is good, it will buy and if it feels scrap is too high, it will not. Since scrap
prices reflect cyclical demand, this counter-cyclical approach is one way TSC can control its raw material costs. So the scrap
supply is decided independently, though in terms of production flow it is delivered on a just in time basis to the mill processing
an order. TSC only buys Japanese scrap. It does not import, since the local price is cheap. Indeed, currently Japan is a net
exporter of scrap. Still, because scrap is so critical to its operation, Tokyo Steel works to maintain good relations with scrap
dealers, which may be one reason why it has not entered the scrap business, even through a subsidiary.
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It takes about three months to progress from order, to material needs, to production and
delivery of a product, based on a rolling inventory of raw material, in-process inventory, and
finished product. Based on this analysis of orders and inventories, each month a more precise
one-month production schedule is sent to each mill. (This is similar to the integrated producers’
approach, except those producers have a six-month schedule for coal and iron ore deliveries
that the mini-mill producers do not face, since their raw material is locally sourced scrap.) As
each mill uses a three-shift system, the Head Office decides the exact shift to which a particular
order is assigned and a precise schedule is then sent to each mill. All this is done through
computer connections. The criteria for assigning orders are first by product, and then
geography. This is because TSC can only assign orders to mills that produce certain products.
In turn, due to transport costs, especially for low-value rebar, it wants the mill near the order
site.
This production assignment task is the responsibility of the Planning Adjustment Center
(PAC) that tracks the output and order data for each mill and adjusts the orders to even out the
product flow for each mill. However, the PAC does not need to use a sophisticated algorithm
to do this, such as the one developed by NSC to allocate its orders between and within mills
(Rapp 2000). Yet, depending on the mill and product, even though TSC is producing a
standard set of products, each product is still made in response to a specific order. It is not
producing product for inventory or speculation. The selling price for each product is posted on
the 20th of every month, and this data is gathered by the TCs who then collect their orders on
the 25th, in response to the prices posted by the various steel producers. Then, depending on the
product, the orders come in two forms, one specifying a delivery date and the other with no
date. The latter are probably being bought by the TCs for their own inventory, while the former
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are coming from specific end-users through the TCs. From TSC’s perspective the ideal
production time, from order to delivery, is about 45 days.
Not all orders are tracked through the system, as is in the case of Nippon Steel (Rapp
2000). This is because TSC produces standard products so its customers have less concern
about the uniqueness of their orders and possible delivery delays. Thus, the TCs only need to
access the aggregate amount of a certain product being produced and shipped. This data is
available from the mill sheet at each mill. Since it is a standard product, quality is guaranteed
as well as a set of specifications. Indeed, inside the computer, the standard products are all the
same in terms of grade, size, etc., and there is no real difference in quality, though when TSC
exports to the US, the specifications will allow for inches. Therefore from TSC’s perspective,
there really is a limited product menu compared to the customized approach of NSC (Rapp
1999 and 2000). However, export prices will vary with the yen, though TSC can only really
export when the yen is weak, not when it is strong, since raw material (scrap) and value-added
costs are then both high.
After production is complete, the Head Office (HO) then instructs each mill via the host
computer at Okayama, how much of each product should be delivered to each stockyard,
including those run by the TCs. The sale is complete at the point of delivery. There is,
however, no direct delivery to the customer. All physical delivery to the customer is done
through the TCs. This differs from the integrated producers, such as NSC (Rapp 2000),
indicating TSC is not as closely connected with its clients. It also reflects a potential
weaknesses in TSC’s low-cost standard product strategy, since there is no design-in potential
or close client collaboration, as there is with NSC’s customized e-commerce JIT strategy (Rapp
1999 and 2000).
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Each of TSC’s mills and offices uses a Fujitsu (FNA) server, but in addition each has
an office automation network. Therefore, each system is independent by plant and office, while
also being linked to the common system. (See schematic diagram of computer network, Exhibit
1.) The initial installation for this system was in 1980, and it has been gradually upgraded. The
last upgrade was at Okayama in April 1997, for the Hot Coil production system. PCs were
introduced in 1991 with a second version in 1996. TSC works in five year increments because
of its lease arrangements and also because it is then generally ready for the next version.
TSC’s current big systems’ effort is due to Y2K, which they are finding expensive to
address. Through November 1997, it had cost them 200 million yen to solve Y2K-related
issues and 240 man months of time. This is because TSC has 18,000 Cobol based systems, and
is creating about 400 new ones a year. Within these systems, about 8,000 programs have had to
be scrapped and replaced due to Y2K. In March 1998 they were able to introduce some
automatic conversion software (Fujitsu RW 2000) that checks each dating system
automatically. While not eliminating the problem, as everything still has to be checked and
tested, this has helped reduce the time required by 100 man-hours.
The number of people they have, who would be considered computer experts, that are
maintaining and running the system/network are ten, three in Tokyo, three in Okayama, and
one at each mill. In terms of the network, everything is concentrated in Okayama, where the
common network is administered. Until 1987 each mill and office had its own independent
program, but after 1987, the system was centralized at Okayama into a common system. The
former method is similar to the way Nucor is still operating its system, in that each mill has its
own IT operation, and there is no common or centralized system. It took TSC one year to
develop its centralized system from the various stand-alone operations.
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The new core system was all designed by TSC, and then outsourced to third party
programmers. That is, essentially all the software for its own unique EMS (Enterprise
Management System) or ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning) was tailor-made from scratch to
TSC’s own design requirements. Subsequent upgrades, changes, and modifications have
usually been done by TSC’s IT group itself. This would include tasks such as how to handle
the order faxes coming to the new mill at Utsunomiya. Since other mini-mill competitors
appear to be doing the same thing, TSC’s view is that despite the cost, this is the common
approach in Japan. (Indeed, see Rapp [1995] with respect to the emphasis large Japanese firms
place on software customization and self-development.) Each production process, and the
programs that control each line, raw material flow, semi-finished production, finishing, and
control operations, were all developed by TSC itself. Further TSC feels these internally
developed systems are a part of the key to its success and efficiency.
However, while these are mainframe-related systems, the process-computers that
control each piece of machinery and equipment are developed by the equipment makers, such
as Hitachi. The software for these controllers is then upgraded. On balance, though, once the
system has been decided, there is not much change unless the process is changed. These
changes are often done at the time of regular annual repair and maintenance (summer/winter
refurbishment). The latest plant at Utsunomiya is the most advanced in using computer
controls, and is virtually 100% Computer Controlled. It can manage the steel within a micron
of thickness, as well as length, speed, etc. However, as part of its focused standardized product
strategy, TSC is only producing ordinary steel products, such as H-beams and rebar used in
general construction, no specialty steels. The sheet it produces goes into furniture, appliances,
and cars. In the case of the latter, they do finishing and galvanizing for companies who buy
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fixed quantities of a specific steel. However, the last two markets will come under real pressure
from NSC’s customized casting e-commerce strategy, especially in a strong yen environment
(Rapp 2000, Dazai 1997 and Dazai & Maruyama 1997). So, it is likely TSC will continue to be
heavily dependent on Japanese construction, even for its plate and sheet sales (Harada 1998).
They do have a special trade subsidiary, though, that maintains contact with the auto industry.
In any case, the Utsunomiya plant uses a very advanced technique of rolling at very
high speed, that must adjust the rolling speed as the product expands, because it is getting
thinner. A computer manages this adjustment. Further, if the overall process can be
accelerated, then more slabs can be processed closer together, without them “running” into
each other. The plant can then produce the required sheet in a shorter time span, improving
productivity. This is similar to NSC’s new rolling system at Kimitsu, except that at Kimitsu
NSC was customize-casting each individual order by thickness, grade, and composition with
each order having its own, unique slab of steel. So in that case, the computer had to allow for
the different specifications associated with each slab as well, since nothing is standardized.
At Utsunomiya, slabs are similar, since TSC is producing a standardized product.
Therefore, the order of difficulty for NSC, compared to TSC, in terms of IT and managing the
caster, is quite different. Nevertheless, the new mill rolls continuously while the old mill
actually stopped and rolled each slab on a batch basis, before moving to the next slab. Such
faster, continuous rolling saves heat and complements the compact size of the new mill, which
also saves heat. In this way energy consumption is improved, increasing overall efficiency.
Furthermore, people controlled the old mill, but now, there is a CRT in front of each furnace,
like a video game. So temperature is controlled remotely. This has helped reduce man-hours so
that each worker is now producing roughly 5000 tons of steel, or double the previous rate
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(Yamada & Cosgrove 1998). This is how the Production Program is designed to more
efficiently and productively support the demand (juchu) represented by orders from the TCs,
and their customers’ demand for steel. Maintaining this demand network, through low cost
supply using IT, remains TSC’s software challenge.
Implementation of Focused Cost Reduction Strategy
When the study team was briefed on TSC’s new IT strategy and its implementation at
the new Utsunomiya Works, (perhaps the world’s most efficient, at 5000 tons of steel per
worker), TSC’s management indicated they had developed the system, themselves, to
implement a focused cost-down or Kaizen (Imai 1986) initiative. Prior to this, steel-making IT
was still very customized at each plant, because each produced different product groups, and so
the associated systems were different. This is because steel production is not like auto
assembly, where the system associated with assembling a car is similar for each car. Autos also
usually have only one design division; so the design system is more integrated into the
production process (Womack, Jones and Roos 1990). However, in steel, even within a standard
product category, each order can have several possible specifications in terms of shape, size,
and grade. Further, the process and materials flow can be different for higher value-added
products, such as H-beams, compared to rebar and can vary with each plant. Product quality
therefore depends on equipment, people, and process control. Managing this situation is
relatively complex, even for mini-mill producers such as TSC, despite its ability to focus
production on specific plants, with self-contained and dedicated IT systems. As explained
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above, HO gathers steel demand information efficiently from the TCs and transfers it to the
mills, producing specific products.29
Once the order is assigned to a plant, that mill’s system takes charge of the order in
terms of production scheduling. Once the order has been specified, the mill’s IT system
controls how and over what period the steel is made. This is called the open steel supply chain,
and there is a one-to-one flow of data and the physical movement of the steel. Thus, as part of
this IT steel management process, TSC gathers data from the many elements that contribute,
directly and indirectly, to the making of the steel and related costs, until it arrives at the
customer. The information flow to a certain degree must mirror the product flow, but it need
not be as precise as in the customized-casting approach used by NSC (Rapp 2000 and Dazai
1997). This is because TSC is producing a range of standard products that can always be
placed in inventory by the TCs, to meet future demand requirements. This may be one reason
why TSC pursues a more focused order production strategy. Still, because TSC’s core business
and investment is in its physical steel production facilities, it is extremely important that it uses
its mills efficiently. This is why it uses computers and sophisticated IT systems to manage the
production system that then feeds into accounting, and the allocation of human resources. TSC
has invested, and continues to invest, heavily in this IT area, including scheduling systems,
even though TSC is concentrating on the most popular steels (ENICOM 1998 and interview
Tokyo Steel). The trunkline making these connections is a high-speed digital network.
For this reason TSC has not been able to adopt an outside ERP (Enterprise Resource
Planning) or EMS (Enterprise Management System) package. TSC sees these factors as
mission-critical issues that its own new proprietary ERP can perform. However, as already
                                         
29 Retailing steel is different and occurs at steel centers, some of which are run by the TCs. While at the product level, each
plant and product has its own control system different from those at other plants, certain functions are controlled centrally.
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explained, this ERP is not a package from an outside vendor, but was developed totally by
TSC. Furthermore, it is completely customized to TSC’s operations, since no outside vendor
would have the knowledge about how the mills and the existing system actually worked! It
must also be tightly integrated with the mills’ physical, technical, and personnel operations and
with the corporate systems or IT used inside the company, i.e. what is not needed to support
steel production or the order system. This is primarily related to Kaikei (accounting) and
human resources (HR), though in addition to personnel, accounting, and production, all
purchasing and sales systems have been developed internally, too.
In this way it appears that the IT strategy is being driven at least partially by TSC’s
strategic decision to move to low-cost focused production, as a way to capture and hold
important customers and market segments. This means mill efficiency must be optimized for a
standard set of products. At the first level of order/production detail, TSC is working on
roughly a monthly basis. At the next level of detail, the production system becomes even more
precise. This is consistent with the focused production strategy described above.
Once TSC receives an order, it first screens it for Quality Design because some mills
can produce as many as 10,000 different steel products. This screening then determines what
processes will be needed to achieve the specified steel and, in turn, the amount of steel that will
be required, as well as the timing for producing that steel, given all other orders in the pipeline.
Once volume and production timing are determined, a delivery date can be scheduled. This
scheduling program was one reason why TSC had a Y2K problem that had to be fixed. Based
on orders TSC has in hand, including those remaining from the previous week, it repeats this
production scheduling process every week and selects the orders to be produced. This weekly
schedule then translates into a daily plan and schedule, leading to the final product.
                                                                                                                            
These include scrap purchases, transportation, aggregate demand forecasts, personnel, and accounting.
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This process control applies to TSC as a whole and all the products it produces.
Sequencing as well as efficient production, a la Toyota (Womack, Jones and Roos 1990), is the
key to economic success in this situation. Major cost efficiency variables appear to be yield,
inventory, and delivery, since the last determines when TSC gets paid, as well as its ability to
efficiently meet its customers’ requirements. In this manner, the system is constantly balancing
costs and physical efficiency, though the emphasis is on the latter. But TSC also knows the
supply chain differs by industry and firm. TSC is not like Takeda or Ito-Yokado, and because
of this, it could not copy a system. Rather, as explained above, it had to develop its own
system, just as Takeda and IY had to develop theirs (Rapp 1998 and 1999).
Benefits, System Linkages and Strategic Impacts
Unlike the integrated producers, there is little information sharing among Japan’s mini-
mills, particularly the “outsiders” (Uriu 1991). Neither have computer systems been closely
compared within the industry. Given this freedom to act independently relative to IT, TSC
feels it can retain the benefits generated by relentlessly pursuing its focused cost-reduction
strategy. Therefore, unlike continuous casting, TSC does not feel IT system benefits will just
be competed away by the industry. Also, TSC can use the data gathered for decision-making
across the firm. Thus, management will have better information to respond to the changes
evolving due to expanding competition. These benefits could be very important when many of
the changes occurring are not just technical, but are regulatory, and are not just limited to steel
firms, but affect customers, too. Indeed, such issues are critical, since steel sales in Japan will
remain TSC’s business for the foreseeable future (Yoshida 1996 and A, F&G 1999).
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Customers, Intermediaries, and Strategic Organization
TSC’s focused approach on a low-cost standard product strategy seems less customer-
oriented than Nippon Steel’s customized approach. Rather, it appears more similar to US
producers, such as Nucor’s. That is, TSC offers its customers, through established price and
availability, the ability to quickly order, at competitive prices, from a predetermined set of
industry standard quality products. However, it cannot respond easily and efficiently if the
customer prefers something else, or wants to design specific customized steel into its lean
production system. Therefore, TSC is at a potential disadvantage among certain customer
segments in comparison to the approach NSC is developing and marketing, that is more
flexible and precise production. NSC believes that with this approach, centered on e-commerce
and customized casting, it can respond more precisely to what is actually demanded by each
customer, even on a JIT basis. (See Rapp 2000, Dazai 1997 and Dazai & Maruyama 1997.)
Since such product-tailoring closely allies customer and producer, TSC is organizationally less
closely tied to its clients than NSC.
Still, TSC’s management has not tried to adapt TSC’s organizational structure to the
software it has developed, or to force its customers to use something convenient or low cost to
TSC, but not helpful to them, such as packaged programs or standard products, not fully
compatible with customer needs. Rather, the overall system has been designed to help TSC
supply to its customers low-cost standard steel products of good quality. Management’s
perspective, in this regard, is that given the segments TSC is targeting, the functional and
market gains from a customized strategy would not justify the additional systems and technical
expense needed to efficiently produce and deliver such products. It is in this way that TSC has
integrated the requirements of its primary customer base, mostly construction companies
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wanting standard products at low cost, into its sales, production, and IT strategy. It is not clear
though whether this will be true for its automobile and appliance customers.
Any outsourcing of IT systems would put TSC and its IT support systems one step
removed from its mills and the TCs. In addition, the overall system, and its close integration
with each mill, is so large and complex that only TSC has the legacy knowledge to modify the
existing systems, or to integrate new systems, without disrupting steel production and product
delivery. These are major reasons TSC has rejected outsourcing or EMS concepts, and has,
instead, developed internally virtually 100% of its own application systems and software. Its
human resource (HR) policies appear to be closely aligned with this process and its IT systems,
as emphasized by Ahlbrandt et all (A, F&G 1996), since employees use them and customers
get the benefits of automation and better, low-cost supply. This approach should continue to
improve costs and, in turn, sales, an important strategic goal in developing the new systems.
Summary – Being a Low Cost Supplier
In their study, “Information Technology, Work Practices, and Wages,” Larry Hunter
and John Lafkas (H & L 1998) note two approaches to using IT in the workplace. One
automates existing practices to reduce skills needed to perform a task, “deskilling”. Ahlbrandt
et al call this “dumbing” (A, F&G 1996). The other enhances employees’ existing skills,
extending capabilities and making them more productive, “upskilling”. H & L indicate that IT
systems that generate information, as opposed to just automating existing tasks, tend to be
“skill-biased” and support high performance work practices. They are “upskilling”. Such
“upskilling” usually improves existing skills, creates new ones, and leads to greater worker
autonomy. The IT system usually evolves and changes with the job so there is a co-evolution
of technology and work practices. As such development is based on the firm’s original choices,
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it supports an evolutionary understanding of IT’s use and how certain firms achieve best
practice (Nelson and Winter 1982). Further, since H&L correlate upskilling with higher wages
and strategy solutions; this approach should be preferred when possible.
Indeed, their specific results and comments on cross-selling and cross-selling prompts
by the IT system are worth repeating here. “More extensive use of this software is consistent
with … the potential of technology to create new kinds of information and new ways of linking
different sorts of data. Such software can suggest sales opportunities to its users, provide
information that enables users to link together … services that might have been previously
unrelated, and can help the service representative to engage the customer more fully in the
sales and servicing processes.” From this perspective, one can see TSC has selected a
combination of upskilling and deskilling in developing its focused cost-down IT system to
solve its strategic problem. Its solution is deskilling to the extent TSC has substituted IT for
tasks previously done by order support personnel. However, it has been upskilling in terms of
mill use, productivity, and related personnel. Overall, from a steel business perspective, the
latter seems more important.
The recent declines in steel demand, combined with the pressures of periodic yen
strength and expanded competition, has forced TSC to develop a steel production, sales, and IT
approach that differentiates it from other Japanese steel producers and foreign competitors.
TSC’s strategy emphasizes continually modernizing its mill structure through a more
automated order and production allocation system, as well as expanding the products it can
supply to meet its customers’ current and evolving steel requirements for standardized
products.
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To differentiate its strategy, TSC’s management is depending on three basic elements:
1) its mill and personnel infrastructure, including its proprietary IT system; 2) its focused
product sales strategy; and 3) management’s evaluation of their existing and potential
customers’ constantly evolving steel requirements. Though difficult, TSC systematically
collects, manages and analyzes the data needed to link these elements together and to integrate
that information directly with its mills’ own sophisticated production systems.  This is because
TSC envisions its customers as having evolving steel requirements that will change and
become more sophisticated over time, given the customers’ own product innovation and the
development of new steel-making technology.  It is also consistent with its own historical
evolution into higher value-added products, and away from commodity steels, such as rebar.
A critical part of TSC’s success in implementing this strategy is to develop, sell, track,
produce, and deliver these products on a timely and cost effective basis.  It must also assure
that its product development evolves in ways responsive to changes in its customers’ steel
requirements. Furthermore, this product development must also be responsive to changes in the
mini-mill technology used to produce steel, and the IT used to control the overall process, from
order to production, to delivery. In turn, TSC is constantly modifying this system, based on its
understanding of how the system is working and how it could be improved, through feedback
from mills, customers, and TCs. In this way TSC is constantly offering new and old customers
better low-cost standard products, responsive to their changing steel demands. The mechanism
to deliver these can be adapted to changes in IT technology, such as web-based ordering. And,
TSC does seem to be good at doing this sort of thing. It has trained personnel, who understand
mini-mill steel production and IT, which are critical to the success of such a strategy. Both
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technical streams are needed to develop higher value-added steel products, new steel making
and processing technologies, and the supporting IT systems.
For example, to efficiently meet customers’ demand, TSC has recently linked several
processes, using artificial intelligence and microprocessors, that now enable higher quality
steel to flow directly from the furnace to the continuous caster, through cold rolling and
finishing (Appendix I – Company Profile). This close integration of organization, personnel,
and technology is important since, as is well known, when conflicts arise among managers and
employees in goal setting, employees can sabotage the system and productivity improvements
become limited (H&L 1998; A, F&G 1996). Simplicity and easily understood, measurable
goals are thus part of this successful IT strategic development and its implementation.
As with other leaders in using IT, establishing eneficial IT loops, with articulated
goals and outcomes, appears to be part of the process, as well. For example, using IT to
improve process, energy, and cost efficiency keeps the information loop on orders, products,
and delivery focused on the customer’s demand for low-cost high-quality standard products
that leads to repeat business. Such repeat orders stabilize revenues and increase TSC’s user
base of products and customers. This reduces the fixed cost per ton of steel produced, while
enhancing demand for higher value-added products, somewhat less subject to price pressures.
This justifies more IT investment to improve and expand the system to other customers and
products, further building revenues, while lowering fixed system costs. Gurley (1998) calls this
use of IT a vortex business (see footnote 25). However, TSC may have to become more
defensive if NSC is able to extend its e-commerce system, which is a vortex system, beyond
the appliance and automobile producers to the major construction companies.30
                                         
30 These results are consistent with those of the Sloan industry center as reported in April 1998 and in A, F&G ( 6). The
Center’s research indicated the critical differentiating variables between steel producers seem to be R&D expenses and the
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 Still, such a customer focused supply capability should lead to more orders. This will
reinforce TCs’ acceptance of the strategy, and TSC will build the basis for its own business
success, including client, industry, and product diversification. This will help reestablish its
earnings and asset base, which have been under pressure (Appendix II). Given current
economic and competitive conditions, domestically and globally, such developments are
critical for TSC’s competitive position in comparison to other Japanese producers (Harada
1998). A stronger company will always find it easier to retain customer and market confidence
in an uncertain environment.
Yet the dangers to TSC, even if its continuous cost-down strategy is fully achieved, of
NSC’s “vortex” business are well stated by William Gurley (1998) and should not be
minimized. This is especially true for a capital-intensive industry, that is vulnerable to
diminishing returns, due to product commoditization and foreign exchange fluctuations.
“Vortex businesses are likely to have one very powerful edge over traditional distribution and
manufacturing operations: They will get increasing returns rather than diminishing marginal
returns. As a site becomes successful, the chances of its becoming more successful increase.
The more buyers are attracted, the more sellers will be drawn in, and the more products that are
available, the more customers will be drawn in. That, in turn, makes content aggregation easier
- vendors must bring you content, rather than your having to gather it. Everything gets drawn
to the center of the vortex. The implication is clear: Great vortex businesses will tend toward
monopolies, and there will be no such thing as second place.” (Gurley 1998)
                                                                                                                            
decision-making process. The more efficient producers spend much more on R&D and push decision making farther down in
the system. In addition, the successful firms have an articulated conscious strategic link between technology and market
objectives, based on technology, people, and organization. Indeed, research by Ichniowski shows organization matters and
particularly the integration of human resources, technology, and plant layout. Also, see Fujitani (1995) on high Japanese R&D
expenditures in steel.
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At the same time, TSC’s integrated IT strategy corresponds to several important criteria
for success in steel, or any business, stressed by Ahlbrandt et al (A, F&G 1996). Each IT
investment decision is “made in light of a focused market strategy” and fits with the totality of
the firm’s investments, including links to steel making technology and the employees’
knowledge base. TSC’s managers, at both the corporate and mill level, “understand and take
advantage of the interlocking nature investments” in the broadest sense, (machines, IT,
employee skills, HR practices, and organization), as well as the complementary relationships.
This includes the recognition that “new technology and human capital must be developed in
use at the same time.” Further strategy and practice are aligned “in the same direction so they
reinforce one another,” and so that improvement is continuous. In turn, the basis for this is “a
conviction about where they want to go that is rooted in a deep understanding of products and
markets,” while “setting a very high goal: to pursue quality and efficiency simultaneously.”
This includes the conviction of TSC’s president, Mr. Iketani (A, F&G and Uriu 1991), another
key management element in A, F&G’s analysis. In addition, the emphasis at TSC along with
the other leading IT users is on the “effective use of technology … to gain quality or cost
advantage”, as opposed to being “on the cutting edge of technology” for its own sake.
In this way one can see that TSC is using IT as an integral part of its business strategy
from order to delivery, even if its model for IT use is not migrating towards controlled
production. This is because it remains focused on being the low-cost supplier to a price-
sensitive order-by-order set of transactions for a standard product, with a well-known market
price. It is not trying to change the very nature of that competitive environment, as NSC is
attempting, through its customized e-commerce strategy. Therefore, TSC has used IT to impact
its competitiveness, but not its competitive environment. It is not trying to change the way its
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customers look at their steel requirements and supply base so as to favor TSC’s business
strategy. It is just trying to be the low-cost provider of its customers’ standard demands.
Yet, TSC uses IT to shape its mills and so conforms to the view presented by Ahlbandt
et al that “truly important cost or quality differences can virtually always be traced to
technology,” … and “ technology shapes the workplace.”  Indeed, this approach would appear
to place TSC in the middle of, rather than beyond, the technology strategic model posed by A,
F&G (1996). In this sense, A, F&G’s view is correct on “the importance of competition in
determining a company’s or an industry’s level of attention and commitment to ongoing
improvements in productivity, quality, and customer responsiveness objectives.”
As explained in the introduction to this case, the major driver for TSC is a focused cost-
down supply strategy in which IT plays a key role. The motivation to keep costs down has
been forced by the need to get ahead of foreign exchange impacts and the industry’s cost-
cutting initiatives during the 1990s. But to do this, TSC’s new approach has to reduce the
ability of competitors to merely emulate TSC’s strategic and technical advances, as facilitated
by global equipment vendors (A, F&G 1996). By coupling steel-making and organizational
skills with proprietary IT systems to create and implement its focused cost-down initiative,
TSC has moved somewhat in this direction, since competitors do not have access to the key IT
element. At the same time, TSC must monitor the impact on its steel business of the ways in
which NSC’s e-commerce customized casting strategy may actually be changing the playing
field and the rules of the game. To the extent TSC is successful, to some degree, in both
respects, their strategy should reinforce the Nikko Research steel analyst’s rating of TSC as the
top Japanese mini-mill company, from a business and an IT strategy perspective, but still a
hold not a buy from an investment perspective.
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APPENDIX I
Profile Tokyo Steel from Its Web-page
“Steel supports the foundation of contemporary society and its use is considered a measure of
the progression of civilization. Because supplies of steel-making resources are limited, steel
recycling is becoming a vital issue. As a leading electric-furnace steel maker, Tokyo Steel is
playing a vital role in recycling important resources, thereby ensuring that these resources are
used more efficiently. In this era of increased emphasis on recycling and efficient resource use,
we believe that our corporate mission is to produce high-quality products at the lowest possible
costs. Currently, we manufacture and market a wide variety of steel products, including H
beams, universal plates, I beams, and other types of steel. Tokyo Steel has succeeded in
developing numerous production technologies in line with its ongoing efforts to provide
customers with top-quality, low-cost steel. Representative of these technologies is our Al
Expert System, a production-control system based on artificial intelligence that enables
efficient control of all phases of steel production. Our in-house developed 150-ton ultra-large
direct current electric furnace-the largest of its type in the world-is controlled by
microprocessors and sensors for the production of high-quality steel. Using these and other
leading-edge technologies, which are attracting attention worldwide, Tokyo Steel is also
vigorously cultivating newer fields, including hot coil. Tokyo Steel was the first Japanese
electric-furnace steel maker to succeed in producing hot coil. By diversifying into leisure and
other fields, we are also contributing the economic development of local communities.
Presently, Japan has one of the world's leading economies and is home to many top companies
in a broad range of industries. With a spirit of challenge, Tokyo Steel will continue to explore
new potentials of steel in its quest to contribute to the further development of society in the 21st
Century. While striving to provide high-value added products, Tokyo Steel is fulfilling an
important social responsibility by carrying out recycling in response to the need of a worldwide
balance between resource usage and the preservation of the environment.” Masanari Iketani,
President
Company Outline and Growth – “Strengthening Our Corporate Structure to Better Meet
Evolving Customer Needs”
Establishment: November 23, 1934
Capital: ¥30.9 billion (As of March 31,1998)
President: Masanari Iketani
Employees: 1,283
Areas of Business: (1) Manufacture and sale of bar, varieties of steel materials, and specialized
steel products.
(2) Acting as agent for insurance against damages and automotive
insurance for damages.
(3) Managing sports facilities, and restaurant business.
(4) Selling and purchasing real estate, leasing, renting and administration
business.
(5) Selling and buying securities, cash flows, foreign exchange business.
Head office: Tokyo
Other offices: Osaka, Nagoya, Kyushu, Takamatsu, and Utsunomiya
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Plants: Okayama, Kyushu, Takamatsu, and Utsunomiya
HISTORY
1934 Company founded.  Total capital: ¥1,000,000.
1936 Senju Plant No.1 open-hearth furnace completed.
1937 Senju Plant No.2 open-hearth furnace completed. Senju Plant small shape mill
completed.
1939 Senju Plant electric arc furnace completed. Senju Plant structural shape mill completed.
1953 Merged with Toa Kokan Kogyo Co., Ltd.
1959 Senju Plant No.3 open-hearth furnace completed.
1960 First construction phase of the Okayama Plant began.
1962 Okayama Plant No.1 open-hearth furnace completed. Okayama Plant structural shape
mill completed.
1964 Okayama Plant small shape mill completed.
1969 Okayama Plant No.1 universal mill completed. Purchased the Kochi Factory of Tosa
Steel Works, Ltd. and started operating it as the Kochi Plant. Purchased Daimaru Seiko
Co. and started operating it as the Kyusyu Plant. Kochi Plant No.1 electric arc furnace
completed.
1970 Moved the Kyusyu Plant to new site at Wakamatsu-ku, Kita-kyusyu. Kochi Plant No.2
electric arc furnace and bloom caster completed.
1971 Kyusyu Plant No.1 and No.2 electric arc furnace and 2~ 3 Strand bloom caster
completed.
1973 Kyusyu Plant structural shape mill completed. Okayama Plant No.1-4 strand bloom
caster completed.
1974 Listed on the second section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
1975 Listed on the second section of the Osaka Stock Exchange. Merged with Tosa Steel
Works, Ltd. Total capital: \4.08 billion.
1976 Listed on the first section of both Tokyo and Osaka Stock Exchanges.
1978 Okayama Plant No.1 and No.2 electric arc furnaces No.2-5 strand bloom caster and No.2
completed.
1979 Okayama Plant bar mill completed. Opened Osaka Office. Succeeded in casting beam
blank at Kochi Plant. Senju Plant finishing mill revamping completed.
1983 Introduced caliber-less rolling and direct rolling technologies in the Takamatsu Plant bar
mill.
1984 Completion of universal mill and new 3 strand combinative at Kyusyu Plant. Started
manufacturing large-size H beam and universal plate.
1987 Changed Osaka office status to Osaka Branch. Opening of Amazing Square.
1989 Completed 130 tons D.C. electric arc furnace at Kyusyu Plant.
1991 Completed hot strip mill at Okayama Plant.
1992 Completed 150 tons D.C. electric arc furnace and 2 strand slab caster Okayama Plant.




Outline of Tokyo Steel’s IT Management System
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Summary Answers to Questions for TSC – Its Steel Strategy & Operations
General Management and Corporate Strategy Yes No
Has the firm integrated IT into their management and production
strategy, including using it to institutionalize organizational strengths
and capture tacit knowledge on an iterative basis?
x
Has the firm succeeded solely on the basis of its software strategy?x
Does the firm believe some customized software and its close
organizational integration enables it to capture and perpetuate on a
more consistent basis certain tacit knowledge and unique corporate
features, i.e. core competencies, that account for its continued success
in the marketplace with reliability and repetition important elements
in their thinking?
x
Is firm’s software strategy successful because it is well managed and
introduces software innovation when it serves corporate goals for
enhancing productivity or customer relations within its industry?
x
Does company generally meet established criteria as a quality
organization such as: effective organizational self assessment, use of
project and especially cross functional teams, improving quality
outcomes through reducing uncertainty, rapidly diffusing learning
throughout the organization including the use of software and
information technology, effective implementation of organizational
and technical change, facilitating change via evolution rather than
revolution or reengineering31, emphasizing participatory
management, having process excellence, using value added analysis,
actively doing benchmarking, constant organizational improvement,
commitment to concrete realistic goals, effectively managing a





Does the firm plan in detail for operational excellence including the
contribution of IT to the allocation of resources?
x, see
web-page
Do planning systems enable management to make better business,
operating and resource allocation decisions, including IT? x
Do projects focus on a small number of IT goals, usually three or
fewer, with a well-defined system reaching from the commitment of
senior management to the department level with associated metrics?
?
                                         
31 MIT Systems Dynamics Group in 9/97 presentation estimated 70% of reengineering efforts fail.
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Is the firm a “high performance” workplace for services? ?
Is there a heavy emphasis on improving process through IT?x
Industry Related
Are industry economics and competitive dynamics important
strategic drivers for the firm and for its use of IT in that IT has been
adapted to the firm’s particular industry and competitive situation?
Are there industry paradoxes such as: falling stock prices, production
improvements that create product improvement difficulties, or
employees’ active product use that retards improvements?
Competition
Is software a significant and successful input into the firm’s
competitive performance?
Does the firm explicitly and consciously perceive implications of IT
strategies and use on their competitiveness and business success?
Are there direct links between IT strategies and overall management
goals?
Do customers, affiliates, competitors, industry analysts, government
officials, industry associations and suppliers perceive the competitive
benefits or impact of the firm’s use of information technology?
Has the firm gained first mover advantages through successfully
introducing software-related innovations?
IT Strategy
Is firm a sophisticated software user that consciously designs and
implements an IT strategy to achieve competitive advantage?
Does firm combine several types of IT to achieve an advantage?
Does firm’s system work to rapidly uncover implementation barriers,















                                         
32 Easton, G. S. and S. L. Jarrell, “Using Strategic Quality Planning More Effectively: Lessons Learned from NSF Project
Research,” Columbia Business School conference presentation, September 1997
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and hierarchical consensus so measured goals are achieved?
Is leadership at different levels actively involved in IT planning,
assessment and deployment with regular progress reviews that link
plans, goals, metrics, milestones, resources and responsibilities?
Does system allow for flexibility and innovation plus change and
individual efforts if they meet goal, planning and metric criteria?
Is there a clear vision making project and new software selection
straightforward and closely related to strategic goals and processes?
Does this IT strategy involve conscious and clearly defined reliance
on customized and semi-customized software in addition to packaged
software with specific criteria and goals for selecting each type, and
do they have ways to measure this so the firm knows customized
software achieves functional or market gains that justify the added
expense, including related costs of integrating customized and non-
customized software into a single information system?
Does firm use option valuation methods to manage uncertain random
outcomes since this approach seems at the software implementation
frontiers even among very well managed companies?32
Does strategy include greater use, development and integration of
industry and company specific vertical application SW and embedded
SW in production & delivery processes to improve competitiveness?
If the firm has an embedded software strategy, is this integrated or
interactive with their other IT and overall business strategy in ways
affecting production, product design or service that improve quality
and costs long term?
Do they favor increased outsourcing of software design and
development?
Does firm believe large-scale outsourcing by many US companies
assumes those firms’ IT systems development need not be integrated
with their business organization and that they view their IT systems
as generic products best developed by outside vendors who can
achieve low cost through economies of scale? That is, do they feel
these firms’ approach focuses on software costs and such firms do not
see differences in systems used by competitors?
Do they believe this is a mistake by competitors that gives them a
long-term and sustainable competitive advantage over such




























strategic software options since systems service companies have an
incentive to develop increasingly standardized products and are one
step removed from the company’s customers and business?
Has the firm established a software strategy that is open and
interactive with its customers and/or suppliers?
Has this enabled it to capture information or cost competitive
externalities?
IT Operations
Do participants own goals and are then committed to implementation
strategies?
Does the firm embed software into its production and delivery
processes with competitive market implications?
Is software technology tied to high speed telecommunications
technology, allowing the firm to track, receive and deliver shipments
or services directly or on-line without further handling or processing?
Does it manage potential risks in extensive IT use or open systems?
Do they work to ensure consistency and reduce programming errors?
Is informal interaction a key aspect of planning and implementation?
Is firm’s system institutionalized and self-reinforcing with good
communication and consensus building while IT plays a role,
including preventing retrospective goals or target reduction?
Human Resource and Organizational Issues
Does firm pay close attention to systems training and organizational
integration for all employees, reducing errors through improved
consistency and staffing efficiencies across the firm since software
can confound even routine operations?
Does certain software require special HR competencies or education?
Does the firm try to change human behavior to use software?


























Are goals or targets tightly linked to regularly reviewed metrics with
inputs coming from all levels that are often cross-functional affecting
large parts of the organization, e.g. cycle times, timely delivery, and
customer satisfaction?
Does the firm have standard agreed ways to explicitly organize or
manage this software selection process?
Does the firm have agreed ways to measure and evaluate success in
using software to promote objectives such as lower costs, contract
time, market share, product development times, or system support?
Are IT costs balanced against overall long-term productivity or
revenue gains?
Does the firm have methods to ensure increased customization costs
result in lower costs downstream so developing and using customized
software makes sense?
Has the firm created large interactive databases to allow automatic
feedback between stages or players in the production and delivery
process? And are these databases constantly being refined and
updated on an interactive basis with actual performance results in a
real time global environment?
Are there competitive and metric impacts such as reducing inventory
costs and wastage while improving the quality of customer service?
Has the firm used software to create beneficial feedback cycles that
increase productivity, reduce cycle times and errors, and integrate
product and delivery?
Do other firms or analysts have alternative measures of
competitiveness or views on the appropriate industry strategy?
Has the firm achieved better than industry growth, superior delivery,
improved control, reduced down-time or changeover problems,
reduced product or process errors, fewer complaints, an improved
product development process, and/or any other definite and
measurable progress relative to competitors?
Do the firm’s metrics go beyond financial to areas like customer
satisfaction, operational performance, and human resources?
Does their evaluation system apply to new product development and



























Can you summarize mission statement on the role and impact of IT as a
tool of competitive advantage for this firm in this industry?
Is it consistent with strategies identified as successful or appropriate in
existing competitiveness research from Sloan’s industry study center?
Are there important business or IT situations requiring further research?
Are intellectual property issues important in explaining firm’s
successful and sustainable use of IT to achieve competitive advantage?
Are beneficial cost impacts generally an important consequence of this
firm’s successful software strategy?
Does this company fit a profile where IT seems most likely to
contribute to enhanced competitiveness?
Based on this study is the market for vertical application and embedded
software growing?
Since Japanese competitors normally do not outsource, do Japanese
firms see themselves as benefiting from this US trend?
Does this leading Japanese firm assign positive value to improved
integration and enhanced control through selective customization?
Do general measures such as decreased costs, as evidenced by reduced
account servicing expenses, reflect benefits of a successful IT strategy?
Are the benefits of a successful software strategy also reflected in
specific industry standards such as an expanded customer base?
Does this leading IT user have explicit criteria for selecting package
versus customized software and for semi-customizing IT packages?
Does this firm closely integrate or couple their software and business
strategies beyond mere alignment?
Do they closely integrate their organizational and HR policies with
their software systems?






















Has IT codified or built on existing organizational strengths or core
competencies, including HR alignment with business and IT strategies?
Have they embraced and integrated information technology as part of
their business strategies and core competencies?
Is MIS function integrated with the rest of the firm in terms of










SOME INDUSTRY AND FIRM DATA
Financial Positions and Forecast: Large Japanese Steel Firms & Tokyo Steel 3/3/98
Consolidated (Billions of Yen and %)
Company Sales Growth Operating Ordinary After-Tax
Rate Profit Profit Profit
Nippon Steel‘98 ¥3077 0.9% 181.6 86.5 5.9
’99 2950 -7.0 130.0 80.0 2.0
’00 2930 -0.7 120.0 80.0 5.0
NKK ‘98 1934 3.0 73.6 37.2 14.3
’99 1860 -3.8 54.0 18.0 5.0
’00 1850 -0.5 52.0 17.0 4.0
Sumitomo ‘98 1469 0.8 98.7 40.7 4.0
’99 1450 -1.3 94.0 31.0 11.0
’00 1500 3.4 104.0 41.0 20.0
Kawasaki ‘98 1244 0.9 74.8 43.4 8.5
’99 1200 -3.5 70.0 42.0 14.0
’00 1200 0.0 73.0 46.0 18.0
Kobe ‘98 1535 0.1 84.4 12.9 -4.9
’99 1450 -5.5 67.0 0.0 -6.0
’00 1430 -1.4 63.0 -4.0 -8.0
Tokyo ’98  167  4.6 -7.7 -8.4 -10.2
’99  145 -13.1 -4.0 -4.0 -5.0
’00  162  11.7 -1.0 -1.0 -2.0
Source: Nikko Research Center, Harada (1998)
Adjustments in the Minimill Sector (Uriu 1991)
Year Number Firms Number FurnacesCapacity (Million MT) Workers
1978 69 146 20.79 36,400
1983 58 115 25.98 30,600
1987 56   93 27.50 19,300
Rankings of Major International Integrated Steel Companies
(Times per year, ¥ bil, MT, 1000¥)
Company* Gross Asset Free Cash Tons per ¥ Operating
 Turnover Rank Flow Rank WorkerRankExpenses/ton Rank
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Nippon Steel 0.69 8 89 3 1048 2 79.9 7
NKK 0.63 10 68 5 664 4 104.9 11
Sumitomo 0.53 12 -13  10 649 5 93.8 10
Kawasaki 0.51 13 73 4 853 3 87.6 8
Kobe 0.64 9 33 6 440 9 179.8 12
Thyssen AG 1.52 1 -27 11 75 13 293.6 13
Usinor Sacilor 1.09 2 113 2 256 11 89.3 9
USX 0.99 3 25 7 508 7 64.8 6
Bethlehem 0.92 4 -33 12 468 8 57.7 5
Iscor 0.87 5 2 9 132 12 47.1 2
British Steel 0.87 6 114 1 322 10 57.3 4
LTV 0.76 7 14 8 569 6 54.7 3
Pohang 0.61 11 -64 13 1234 1 46.4 1
Source: Nikko Research Center (Harada 1998)
Cost Reduction Efficiency Indices Major Japanese Producers 1994-98 (Average 1994=100)
Company/Year1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 ‘94-‘98 Reduction
NSC 100.4 96.8 93.5 95.4 94.1 -6.3
NKK 99.9 98.0 94.9 95.3 96.2 -3.7
Sumitomo 100.4 98.1 94.9 95.1 95.5 -4.9
Kawasaki 100.5 98.8 96.3 95.1 94.0 -6.5
Kobe 97.6 95.0 92.7 95.6 96.6 -1.1
Source: Nikko Research Center (Harada 1998)
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Cost Reduction vs. Revenues: Tokyo Steel and Major Japanese Producers 1993-97
Company NSC NKK S-Steel K-Steel Kobe Tokyo 7EF
Tons /worker 697 475 453 549 288 2858 1473
Cost/ton ’93 76067 79241 90228 82474 87551 41315 50850
’97 64588 65494 83471 67078 83662 38836 46030
¥ Benefit 11480 13747   6757 15396   3889   2479   4820
% Benefit    17.8    21.0      8.1    23.0      4.6      6.4 10.5
Revenue/t ’93 80895 77207 96076 83963 74980 48051 57646
‘97 66764 67696 85981 69454 62492 38836 46030
Cost % ’93    94.0  102.6     93.9    98.2  116.8    86.0    88.2
Revenue ’97    96.7    96.7    97.1    96.6  133.9  104.5  102.3
Source: Nikko Research Center (Harada 1998); 7 EF is average for 7 largest electric furnace producers.
Expected 1997-98 Steel Related Earnings, Volume & Prices (Unconsolidated) – (¥ Billions)
NSC, NKK & TSC/Year 3/91 3/92 3/93 3/94 3/95 3/96 3/97E 3/98E
Nippon Steel Revenues2231 1950 1723 1683 1722 1722 1725 1720
% Total Sales 84.8 82.3 79.8 80.5 82.0 79.0 78.6 78.2
Volume (million MT)26.7 24.1 24.4 25.4 25.7 25.9 25.9 25.8
% Annual  -3.3 -9.7   1.4   3.8   1.2   0.7   1.0 -0.4
Price/ton (¥1000/MT)83.6 80.9 70.5 66.3 67.1 66.6 66.6 66.7
% Annual    1.8 -3.2 -12.8 -5.9   1.1 -0.7   0.1   0.2
NKK Steel Revenues 978 866 760 734 740 724 732 726
% Total Sales 74.4 68.6 63.2 62.6 63.8 61.1 64.2 63.9
Volume 11.7 10.7 10.6 10.3 10.2 10.0 10.2 10.0
% Annual  -3.7 -8.7 -1.2 -2.8 -0.9 -1.5   1.0 -1.5
Price per ton 80.5 77.2 68.9 66.9 67.8 67.7 67.9 68.4
% Annual    2.5 -4.1 -10.7 -3.0   1.4 -0.1   0.3   0.7
Tokyo Steel Revenues 212 201 152 140 144 164 192 204
% Total Sales 99.5 99.0 99.3 99.7 99.0 99.2 99.2 99.2
Volume   3.8   4.1   3.8   3.8   3.8   4.3   4.8   5.0
% Annual   -0.8   7.7  -5.4  -1.6   1.4 12.1 12.1   3.7
Price per ton 56.3 49.4 39.4 37.0 37.6 38.1 39.9 40.7
% Annual  -99.9 -12.2 -20.3 -6.2   1.7   1.3   4.8   2.8
Source: Salomon Brothers Japanese Equity Research (Yoshida 1997)
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Key Firm Data - Tokyo Steel 3/31/93 3/94 3/95 3/96 3/97E 3/98E
Revenues (Billion ¥) 203.3 152.7 140.3 145.8 165.3 194.0
Operating Income  22.0 (14.7)   (9.2)  (5.2)  (1.0) 14.0
Income Pretax  24.5 (12.3) (8.7) (9.8)  (4.0) 13.5
Cash Flow  32.4 3.9 5.0 5.2 6.3  8.9
Capital Expenditures 51.4 3.0 3.8 47.7 26.0  5.0
Steel Revenues 200.9 151.6 139.9 144.3 163.9 192.5
Sheet 28.5 33.1 42.7 52.6 60.1 75.2
Rebar 64.9 47.1 35.6 29.6 34.7 35.2
H-Beam 92.5 49.4 42.6 42.6 45.8 53.0
Other 15.0 22.0 19.0 19.5 23.3 29.0
Total Assets 309.8 271.4 270.9 264.7 215.1 215.1
Cash Assets 104.3 96.8 70.6 49.4 41.0 54.9
Current Assets 183.5 161.8  163.8 131.5 - -
Property, Plant, Equipment117.6 104.4 101.8 127.6 134.4 120.0
Debt 69.3 54.3 55.6 55.4 24.2 24.0
Stockholder’s Equity 209.9 193.7 182.7 171.6 159.4 148.3
Steel Output (1000 tons) 4065 3847 3784 3837 4300 4820
H-Beam (1000 tons) 1820 1300 1165 1150 1225 1350
(price 1000¥/ton) 50.8 38.0 36.5 37.0 37.4 39.3
Rebar (volume) 1320 1240 1090 920 990 1000
(price) 49.2 38.0 32.7 32.2 35.0 35.3
Sheet (volume)   620   807 1050 1270 1540 1850
(price) 46.0 41.0 40.7 41.4 39.0 41.8
Employees 1480 1534 1508 1442 1340 1320
Steel Scrap Price (¥/ton) 14200 16400 16300 15500 14000 14200
Pre-Tax Return on Equity (%)11.7 -6.4 -4.8 -5.7 -7.1 -6.9
Source: K. Yoshida (1996), H. Suzuki (1998)
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Firm Data (continued - billion ¥) 3/96 3/97 3/98 3/99E3/00E
ASSETS & LIABILITIES
Cash, Short term Money Claims 72.1 41.0 54.9 36.5 46.0
Fixed Assets 127.6 134.4 120.0108.5 99.0
Total Assets 264.7 247.3 236.2215.1215.1
Debt 24.2 24.2 24.0 10.0 10.0
Equity 171.6 159.4 148.3141.3141.3
Sales 145.8 159.6 166.9140.0141.0
Operating Income   -5.2   -8.2 -7.7 -7.0    0.0
Net Income   -9.8 -11.3 -10.2  -7.0    0.0
Cash flow 5.2 6.3 8.9 9.5 14.5
Investment 41.6 26.1 6.0 5.0  5.0
Steel Sales (1000 MT) 3737 4145 4103 3900 4000
H-Beam 1550 1745 1700 1660 1750
Rebar  955  800  800 840 850
Hot Coil 1332 1600 1603 1400 1400
Steel Price (1000¥/MT) 37.5 38.1 40.1 35.4 34.5
H-Beam 37.5 38.5 39.3 34.6 35.0
Rebar 34.0 32.5 34.0 27.6 27.0
Hot Coil 39.0 39.0 44.3 40.0 38.0
Scrap Price (1000¥/MT) 13.5 13.8 15.0 11.0 11.0
Pre-tax ROE (%) -5.7 -7.1 -6.9 -5.0  0.0
Source: H. Suzuki, 1998
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